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TRADE CREDIT USE DURING A FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.K. OF A NON-EXISTING TRADE CREDIT CHANNEL 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Extensive previous research exists on the use of trade credit during tight monetary policy. 
Several studies have found evidence of a trade credit channel when monetary policy triggers 
bank credit rationing, but prior research on trade credit during financial crises is still limited. 
The results of Love et al. (2007) from large firms in developing markets suggest the use of 
trade credit may behave differently in a severe credit crunch than during times of tight 
monetary policy. This study broadens the previous research on trade credit use by 
concentrating on both large and small firms in a developed financial market during a crisis, 
and asks whether the use of trade credit changes during a financial crisis, and whether firms’ 
vulnerability to the crisis affects this potential change. 
DATA 
The analysis is based on a panel data of 1,084 manufacturing firms in the U.K. collected from 
Orbis database. The firms are versatile in terms of size and public listing. The research period 
ranges from 2004 to 2008, in which the last two years are treated as crisis years and the 
previous years are included for comparison. 
RESULTS 
The results show robust evidence of a declining use of trade credit in 2008 and some limited 
evidence of a decline already in 2007. There is no support for a trade credit channel. Firm size 
is found to be positively related with the provision of trade credit in 2008, but the magnitude 
of the effect is small in relation to the overall negative effect of the year. Larger firms seem to 
be decreasing their provision of trade credit less than smaller firms, but size is also positively 
related to change in obtained trade credit during both 2007 and 2008.    
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Aiempi kauppaluottoja kireän rahapolitiikan aikana käsittelevä tutkimus on laajaa. Useat 
tutkimukset ovat löytäneet näyttöä kauppaluottojen rahoituskanavasta aikoina, jolloin 
pankkiluottojen saanti on rahapolitiikan seurauksena rajoittunutta, mutta aiempi tutkimus 
kauppaluotoista rahoitusmarkkinoiden kriisiaikoina on vielä vähäistä. Love et al. (2007) 
tutkivat suuria yrityksiä kehittyvillä markkinoilla, ja heidän tuloksensa viittaavat siihen, että 
kauppaluottojen rooli on erilainen vakavan luottopulan olosuhteissa kuin kireän rahapolitiikan 
aikoina. Tämä Pro Gradu -työ laajentaa aiempaa tutkimusta kauppaluottojen käyttöön sekä 
suurissa että pienissä yrityksissä rahoitusmarkkinoiden kriisin aikana kehittyneillä 
markkinoilla ja kysyy,  muuttuuko kauppaluottojen käyttö rahoitusmarkkinoiden kriisin 
aikana ja, vaikuttaako yritysten suojaamattomuus kriisille tähän potentiaaliseen muutokseen.  
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Lähdeaineistona käytetään 1 084 isobritannialaisen valmistustuotantoa harjoittavan yrityksen 
otosta, joka on kerätty Orbis-tietokannasta. Yritykset ovat vaihtelevia koon ja 
pörssilistautumisen osalta. Tutkimusperiodi kattaa vuodet 2004-2008, joista vuosia 2007 ja 
2008 käsitellään kriisivuosina ja aiemmat vuodet ovat mukana vertailukohtana.  
TULOKSET 
Tutkimuksessa löytyy vahvaa näyttöä kauppaluottojen käytön vähenemisestä vuonna 2008 
sekä suppeampia merkkejä vähenemisestä jo vuonna 2007.  Tutkimustuloksissa ei näy 
merkkejä kauppaluottojen rahoituskanavasta. Yrityksen koko on positiivisesti yhteydessä 
kauppaluottojen myöntämiseen vuonna 2008, mutta vaikutuksen suuruusluokka on pieni 
verrattuna ko. vuoden yleiseen negatiiviseen vaikutukseen. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että 
suuremmat yritykset vähentävät kauppaluottojen myöntämistä lievemmin kuin pienemmät 
yritykset, mutta yrityksen koko on myös positiivisesti yhteydessä saatuihin kauppaluottoihin 
sekä vuonna 2007 että 2008.  
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1. Introduction 
Whenever payment does not occur simultaneously with the delivery of goods or services, the 
supplier is providing a short-term loan to the customer. This is called trade credit and it has 
been shown to be an important source of short-term financing for most firms. A fundamental 
aspect of trade credit is its two-way nature. Most firms, particularly those at an intermediate 
points in the value chains, both obtain trade credit from their suppliers and extend it to their 
customers. Trade credit thus represents a sizable component of both liabilities and assets. For 
example in the U.K. more than 80% of ‘business to business’ transactions are on credit terms 
(Wilson & Summers, 2002). Accounts payable clearly exceed short-term bank loans in 
manufacturing firms (Anatasova & Wilson, 2003). In the country’s publicly listed companies, 
70% of total short-term credit extended and 55% of credit received took the form of trade 
credit during 1983-1995 (Kohler et al., 2000).  
It is not self-evident why industrial firms extend credit to their customers when there are 
institutions specialized in providing finance. A number of theories have tried to explain the 
phenomenon. These theories can be divided into two categories. First, several researchers 
have identified possible transaction motives for the use of trade credit. The motives vary by 
nature, but range from purely reducing transaction cost by making payments less frequently 
(Ferris, 1981), reducing informational asymmetries (Long et al., 1993; Ng et al., 1999; Smith, 
1987) or gaining a mean to price discriminate (Brennan et al., 1988; Petersen & Rajan, 1997) 
to safeguarding an implicit equity stake in the customer firm (e.g. Smith, 1987; Petersen & 
Rajan, 1997).  
The second group of theories is founded on the financing motive for the use of trade credit. 
These  theories  emphasize  reasons  that  may  cause  a  supplier  to  have  a  financing  advantage  
over traditional lenders in providing credit to a customer. The advantage may arise from the 
supplier’s superior position in monitoring (e.g. Mian & Smith, 1992; Jain, 2001) and 
controlling the customer (Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Cuñat, 2007), higher salvaging value of 
collateral (e.g. Mian & Smith, 1992; Frank & Maksimovic, 2005) or better knowledge of the 
market (Ng et al., 1999).  
While the transaction motives imply the role of trade credit can differ between industries, 
firms or countries, it also points to the relatively stable nature of trade credit through business 
cycles. The financing motive on the other hand suggests the use of trade credit may vary 
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depending on the availability of other sources of financing. This idea forms the foundation for 
the trade credit channel theory, which suggests that during periods of restricted bank 
financing, e.g. during contractionary monetary policy, or in a more severe case, financial 
crisis, firms increase their use of trade credit (see eg. Kohler et al., 2000; Nilsen, 2002; 
Mateut et al., 2006). Thus trade credit may substitute traditional sources of financing. More 
specifically the theory suggests firms which are less vulnerable to a reduction in money 
supply, in terms of lower reliance to bank financing or lower likelihood of being credit 
rationed, redistribute financing to the more vulnerable firms as trade credit. Thus it is claimed 
that the substitution of bank credit with trade credit somewhat alleviates the asymmetric 
negative effects of credit rationing by banks during a tight money period. 
The  history  of  the  trade  credit  channel  theory  extends  back  to  the  1960s,  when  it  was  first  
suggested by Meltzer (1960). There exists an extensive literature on trade credit during tight 
monetary policy, which is concentrated in the developed financial markets, most notably the 
U.S. As far as I am aware, only two studies extend the research into financial crisis. These 
studies by Taketa and Udell (2007) and Love et al. (2007) show that the use of trade credit 
during a crisis may be more complex than the previous studies suggest. Taketa and Udell 
(2007) find some evidence of trade credit and bank credit acting as complements rather than 
substitutes during the Japanese banking crisis, but their aggregated data does not allow them 
to explore the finding in more detail. Love et al.’s (2007) study on six emerging countries 
during financial crises in the 1990s shows an increase in trade credit provided and obtained 
immediately after the crisis begins, as the trade credit channel theory would predict. But 
surprisingly they find that the amount of trade credit provided collapses in the aftermath of 
the crisis even though their sample only includes large, publicly traded firms, which are likely 
to be more resilient to crisis events.   
Firms facing high and low agency costs have a different role in the trade credit channel. The 
most often cited proxy for agency costs is firm size. Any study focusing only on large firms is 
unlikely to capture the whole phenomenon. The main contribution of this study is that it 
broadens Love et al.’s (2007) work on trade credit channel during financial crises to include 
both large and small firms. Since the role of trade credit financing varies between countries 
and is more important in less developed financial and legal systems, studying whether Love et 
al.’s (2007) findings during crises periods also apply to developed financial markets is 
warranted. During the past years, the markets have witnessed a historically severe credit 
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crunch, which has affected the global financial centers the most. This offers a possibility to 
test the trade credit channel theory during a financial crisis in a background setting 
comparable to most of the studies during tight monetary policy. This study focuses on the 
U.K. because of the availability of firm level data from unquoted and small firms.   
The use of trade credit is studied using fixed effects panel regression model. The research 
period ranges form 2004 to 2008. The last two years of the sample represent crisis years, 
which are compared against the previous years of normality within firms. Although most 
readers are likely to be aware of the progress of the crisis during the period, Figure 1 justifies 
why years 2007 and 2008 are characterized as crisis years. 
 
The global credit boom peaked in mid-2007, following a meltdown of subprime mortgages in 
the  U.S.  Lack  of  transparency  of  securitized  products,  and  who  were  holding  them,  raised  
concerns about the solvency of financial institutions drying out interbank financing and 
triggering a liquidity shortage. The crisis spread quickly to Europe. The U.K. banking sector, 
which includes large internationally active banks, was hit especially hard. Figure 1 shows 
how the spread in sterling 3-month interbank lending rate was reasonably flat during the 
research period, varying from 9 to 18 basis points, until July 2007 when the sub-prime 
mortgages started to erode trust between banks. After this the spread increased significantly, 
reaching an average of 102 basis points during the rest of the research period. In mid-
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September 2008 the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the U.S. caused a full-blown banking 
panic increasing the spread even further. The highest average monthly spread (250 basis 
points) is reported for October 2008, before the government rescue operations eased the panic 
in the market. The government and Bank of England introduced a number of policy measures 
to forestall a systemic breakdown. The initial rescue package was launched in October 
introducing large-scale guarantees of bank liabilities and an initial round of capital injections 
to Lloyds/HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland. Around the same time the Bank of England 
expanded its special liquidity scheme, eased collateral requirements on open market 
operations and revamped its emergency lending facilities.  
Since the summer of 2007 banks sought to restructure their balance sheets through new 
capital, selling assets and reining back their lending to the private sector. The results of the 
Credit Conditions Survey by the Bank of England indicate that lenders reduced the 
availability of credit to businesses between Q3 2007 and the end of 2008 (Bank of England, 
2009b). The Agents of the bank also conducted surveys throughout the crisis. In November 
2007 nearly half of the respondents reported credit conditions had tightened (Bank of 
England, 2007), while their share grew by approximately 10 percentage points till September 
2008 (Bank of England, 2008a). 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the changes in trade credit use when bank credit is 
limited. Most of the previous literature suggests firms should both provide more trade credit 
to  their  customers  and  obtain  more  trade  credit  from their  suppliers  (Hypothesis  1),  but  the  
results  by  Love  et  al.  (2007)  imply  that  the  trade  credit  dynamics  may  not  be  this  straight  
forward during a crisis. This study also aims to answer whether firms’ vulnerability to the 
crisis affects the possible change in their use of trade credit. The hypothesis is that firms, 
which are more vulnerable to the crisis, increase trade credit obtained from their suppliers 
more than less vulnerable firms (Hypothesis 2). On the contrary, it is expected that firms, 
which are less vulnerable to the crisis, increase provision of trade credit to their customers 
more than more vulnerable firms (Hypothesis 3). 
There are differences in the research settings of this and earlier studies that may influence the 
results. The trade credit channel theory has not been previously tested in developed markets 
during a financial crisis. In addition to the different level of financial and legal system 
development in the studied countries, the inclusion of small firms in the sample separates this 
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study from Love et al.’s (2007) work. The severity and global reach of the credit crunch 
during the research period may also impact the results in a way, which cannot be fully 
anticipated in light of the previous literature. 
This study shows evidence that firms’ trade credit use behaves very differently during a crisis 
than during periods of tight monetary policy. The main finding is that firms both obtain less 
trade credit from their suppliers and provide less trade credit to their customers in 2008. The 
result  is  robust  and  significant  at  the  1  % level  in  all  of  the  statistical  models  in  this  study.  
This finding partly supports Love et al.’s (2007) results of a decreasing trade credit provision 
after early stages of a financial crisis, but unlike Love et al., this study is unable to find any 
evidence of a trade credit channel at any time during the crisis. The  results  also  show  a  
decrease in both trade credit obtained and provided.  
The empirical analysis offers only very limited support for characterizing year 2007 as a crisis 
year. The results imply trade credit is used in a similar manner in 2007 as during the control 
years, although there are some weak and unrobust results of a marginal reduction in aggregate 
trade credit provision already in 2007.  
Analysis of the possible factors attributing to the decline in trade credit use provides only 
little additional insight. The most often used proxy for financing constraints, firm size is 
positively related to trade credit provision, but the effect is small in magnitude and its 
statistical significance becomes low when control variables are added to the regression model. 
The results show some evidence though, that larger firms decrease their trade credit provision 
less than smaller firms, which would seem to imply they are less vulnerable to the crisis, but 
still somewhat affected. This conclusion is supported by the results that size is also positively 
related to trade credit obtained during 2008. Thus it seems unlikely the reduction in trade 
credit use is caused by a lower demand for trade credit and a more plausible explanation 
appears to be a reduction in trade credit supply. However, since the results are limited, further 
studies are needed to find out why a trade credit channel does not exist during a crisis.  
In regard to other proxies for the vulnerability to a crisis, this study is unable to yield any 
results. Liquidity is found to be negatively associated with trade credit received in general, 
but the results do not support the hypothesis of a particular relationship in a crisis.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 discusses previous 
literature on the transaction and financing motives for the use of trade credit, following by an 
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introduction to the trade credit channel theory. Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of trade 
credit practices in the U.K. before the hypotheses are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
moves on to the methodology explaining panel regression analysis first generally and then the 
regression models used in this study more specifically. After methodology, Chapter 6 
describes the data. Results are presented in Chapter 7 before concluding in Chapter 8. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
Whenever payment and delivery of goods or services do not occur simultaneously, payment 
arrangements are, in effect, credit terms. Trade credit is widely used across industries and 
geographical areas. It is not self-evident why industrial firms engage in lending to their 
customers when there are traditional lenders who are specialized in assessing credit risk, 
financing and collecting receivables.  
Several theories try to explain the use of trade credit. These theories can be divided into two 
groups. While some focus on transaction motives, others emphasize financial motives for the 
use of inter-firm financing. The theories are not mutually exclusive and few of them can 
explain the use of trade credit in all types of transactions its use is witnessed in reality. Most 
likely  several  reasons  play  a  role  simultaneously  and  with  different  weights  in  different  
transactions.  For  example,  Elliehausen  and  Wolken  (1993)  estimate  that  for  the  small  U.S.  
firms  in  their  sample,  the  financing  component  is  two-fifths  to  one-half  the  size  of  the  
transaction component, and both motives appear to be economically significant determinants 
of trade credit use. 
This chapter covers the most plausible theories of both transaction and financing motives. The 
last sub-chapter introduces the bank lending and trade credit channel theories, and discusses 
how they relate to the financing motives. 
2.1. Transaction Motives 
The simplest explanation for the use of trade credit is that it reduces the transaction costs of 
paying bills. Rather than making payments daily, a firm can accumulate obligations and pay 
them less frequently. This also enables the firm to separate the payment cycle from the 
delivery schedule, make cash flows more predictable and reduce the level of precautionary 
cash holdings (Ferris, 1981). Firms with variable demand can also use credit terms instead of 
price to deal with the fluctuations (Emery, 1984; Long et al., 1993).  
In addition to the explanations based on the ability to manipulate the timing of payments, 
researches have identified three main transaction motives that may explain the use of trade 
credit. The motives stem from asymmetric information between the seller and the buyer, from 
an incentive to price discriminate and from the seller’s implicit equity stake in the buyer firm.  
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2.1.1. Asymmetric Information between the Supplier and the Customer 
Trade credit can reduce the transaction costs arising from asymmetric information between 
the supplier and the customer. Seller-provided guarantees and reputation can reduce concerns 
about product quality while buyer reputation and credit rating can reduce concerns about non-
payment. Reputation-based approaches are not complete solutions though, especially when 
trading  partners  are  new,  small  or  distant  from each  other  (Ng et  al.,  1999).  Payment  terms  
can be used to address the problems arising from asymmetric information. First, a supplier 
who lacks sufficient reputation or whose products require more time to observe quality can 
extend trade credit so that buyers can verify product quality before payment (Long et al., 
1993). In this sense trade credit is an effective guarantee. Second, specific terms (e.g. early 
payment discounts) can enable customers to reveal credit quality through their payment 
practices (Smith, 1987).         
2.1.2. Price Discrimination 
Trade credit may also be used to price discriminate. Credit terms are usually invariant to the 
credit quality of the buyer, and thus trade credit reduces the effective price to low-quality 
borrowers (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). Brennan et al. (1988) show theoretically that when there 
is low competition in the product market, suppliers have an incentive to price discriminate 
between cash and credit customers. This is possible when the reservation price of credit 
customers  or  demand  elasticity  are  lower  than  that  of  cash  customers  or  if  there  is  adverse  
selection in the credit market.  
Another way of seeing the price discrimination motive is to think of firms having a high 
margin between sales and variable costs. These firms have an incentive to make additional 
sales without cutting the price to their existing customers. Antitrust laws often prevent direct 
price discrimination, but high-priced trade credit may be used as a subsidy targeted at risky 
customers. Creditworthy customers will find the trade credit overpriced and pay immediately 
while risky customers will find it worthwhile to borrow because trade credit may still be 
cheaper than their other sources of finance (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). 
2.1.3. Supplier’s Implicit Equity Stake in the Customer Firm 
A supplier might not discriminate in favour of the risky customers solely to support sales in 
the short-term. It may have a long-term interest in the survival of the customer firm. The 
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supplier then considers not only the net profit margin on the current sales but also the present 
value of the profit margins on future sales to the same customer. In other words, the supplier 
may have an implicit equity stake in the customer, especially if it has few substitutes for the 
buyer or it has made a non-salvageable investment in the relationship (Smith, 1987; Petersen 
& Rajan, 1997).  
Huyghebaert et al. (2001) argue that because of their implicit equity stake, suppliers also 
adopt a more lenient liquidation policy for defaulting firms than banks, which hold a much 
smaller implicit equity stake in their borrowers. Thus entrepreneurs who value control rights 
may limit their bank borrowings and take up granted trade credit. Huyghebaert (2006) offers 
empirical evidence for the argument by showing that when ownership of a start-up company 
is  highly  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the  entrepreneur,  firms  borrow  more  from  their  
suppliers.  
The transaction motives suggest trade credit is offered when informational asymmetries 
between the supplier and the buyer are high, when demand is variable or when the supplier 
has high sales margins or a high level of specialized investment at stake. The theories raise 
several hypotheses. For example they propose that trade credit terms vary across industries 
and that young and small firms offer more trade credit than established and large ones. The 
transaction motives also suggest trade credit is reasonably stable over time.  
2.2. Financing Motives 
The proponents of the financing motives explaining the use of trade credit argue that if trade 
credit simply existed to minimize transaction costs, then we should have witnessed a long-
term decline in trade credit use due to the many improvements in transaction technologies that 
have taken place. Such a trend has not occurred, which seems to suggest there must be more 
to the use of trade credit (e.g. Frank & Maksimovic, 2005). 
This chapter explains how the financing motives are based on asymmetric information 
between banks and firms, which may create a financing advantage to the supplier. If banks are 
not willing to lend to some firms but suppliers are, then trade credit may substitute bank credit 
in the financing mix of credit rationed firms. However, it seems trade credit comes behind 
bank credit in the financing ‘pecking order’.  
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2.2.1. Suppliers’ Financing Advantage over Banks 
While the transaction motives may stem from informational asymmetries between sellers and 
buyers, the financing motives are based on asymmetric information between banks and firms. 
This asymmetry may preclude financing of valuable projects. Biais and Gollier (1997) offer a 
theoretical model, which explains how trade credit can alleviate this problem by incorporating 
in the lending relation the private information held by suppliers about their customers. The 
private information gives the supplier a financing advantage over traditional lenders in 
investigating the credit worthiness of the customer, as well as a better ability to monitor and 
force repayment of the credit.  
The financing advantage can come from at least four sources. First, a supplier may have lower 
monitoring costs than a bank. It can gather information as a by-product in the normal course 
of business from e.g. the timing and size of the customer’s orders and the buyer’s inability to 
take advantage of early payment discounts. Thus the supplier may be able to get the 
information faster and at lower cost than a traditional financier (Mian & Smith, 1992; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Jain, 2001). Jain (2001) argues that both the bank and the seller are 
better of when the bank lends to the seller with superior information, which intermediates the 
loan to the buyer as trade credit. However, the buyer looses since it pays a higher interest rate 
than on direct loans from the bank.   
Second, the supplier can have an advantage in salvaging value from existing assets. If the 
buyer defaults, the supplier can seize the goods supplied. The more durable the goods are, the 
better collateral they make. Financial institutions can also reclaim the firm’s assets to pay off 
the loan. However, because the financial institution lacks the network and expertise for selling 
the goods, the supplier’s costs of repossessing and reselling are likely to be lower (Mian & 
Smith, 1992; Frank & Maksimovic, 2005; Petersen & Rajan, 1997). In many jurisdictions 
trade credit is junior unless it is secured (Fabbri & Menichini, 2010). Longhofer and Santos 
(2003) argue this maximizes social welfare. When the collateral value of the supplied goods is 
higher for the seller than for banks, giving trade creditors a security interest in the assets, 
while  subordinating  the  rest  of  their  claim,  benefits  both  the  trade  creditors  and  other  debt  
holders.  
Third, the supplier may have an advantage in controlling the buyer especially if the buyer is 
dependent on the supplied goods, has few alternative sources for the goods and the customer 
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does not make up a large share of the supplier’s sales. In these cases, the threat of cutting off 
future supplies can be more effective and immediate than the threat of cutting of future 
finance (Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Cuñat, 2007). 
 And last, the supplier may have an informational advantage because of superior knowledge 
of the market. Conducting business with a network of similar buyers may help the seller to 
distinguish between a customer who is in financial trouble and a general decline in the market 
(Ng at al., 1999).     
2.2.2. Substitution of Trade Credit and Other Sources of Financing 
The financing advantage means firms may be more willing to offer trade credit to their 
customers than financial institutions are to lend to the same firms. Several theories suggest 
trade credit and other sources of financing can be substitutes. Huyghebaert’s (2006) study 
shows that start-ups use more trade credit when financial constraints are large. Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) study small firms in the U.S. and find that firms use more trade credit when 
credit from financial institutions is unavailable. Their results also suggest firms with better 
access to traditional financing offer more trade credit. Similar results are found in a study 
with a large sample of public and private firms in the U.K., which shows demand for trade 
credit decreases with both institutional finance and internally generated funds (Atanasova, 
2007). These studies suggest trade finance is lower in the ‘pecking order’ (Myers & Majluf, 
1984) than both internally generated cash and institutional borrowing.  
The position in the pecking order is claimed to be a consequence of the relatively high cost of 
trade credit. Huyghebaert et al. (2001) and Wilner (2000) argue that because of their more 
lenient liquidation policy and willingness to grant more concessions to customers in financial 
distress, suppliers attract the higher risk debtors. Thus the higher price of trade credit reflects 
the higher credit risk.  
However, most firms use both trade and bank credit instead of resorting to trade credit only 
after other cheaper sources of financing are no longer available. Biais and Gollier (1997) 
explain that suppliers have private information about their customers, which is signalled to 
bank creditors through the use of trade credit. In their model, the availability of trade credit 
facilitates the access to relatively cheap bank credit, and thus they suggest trade credit may 
also complement bank credit. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) present a similar argument. They 
claim that the source of supplier’s informational advantage is the input transaction itself. 
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Suppliers regularly lend inputs, but they rarely lend cash. While cash can be easily diverted, 
i.e. used in a way, which does not maximize the lender’s expected return, most inputs are 
harder to divert. The result of their model is that the availability of trade credit increases the 
amount that banks are willing to lend, because banks anticipate that the available trade credit 
boosts investment rather than diversion.  
Although trade credit is typically considered to be relatively expensive, this assumption has 
also been debated. Two-part credit terms (i.e. early payment or cash discounts) are relatively 
common in supplier financing. The interest rates implicit in these arrangements are in most 
instances considerably higher than the interest rates on loans for working capital charged by 
financial institutions. When trade credit is used at the cost of discounts it is very expensive in 
comparison to institutional finance. It may, however, be perceived to be cheaper because the 
transaction costs of obtaining trade credit are less than of obtaining institutional financing. 
Arranging  credit  requires  time  and  effort  and  a  large  part  of  these  costs  are  fixed.  The  
combination of interest and transaction costs may make closed-end credit from financial 
institutions seem more expensive than trade credit for meeting recurring needs for working 
capital, especially if the amount of credit needed is small (Elliehausen & Wolker, 1993). Thus 
it has been argued that smaller firms will perceive trade credit to be cheaper than institutional 
credit and may prefer to use trade credit and late payment rather than bank debt (Howorth & 
Reber, 2003).  
Trade credit may become even cheaper if penalties for late payment are not enforced, as often 
happens (e.g. Pike & Cheng, 2001; Wilson & Summers, 2002). However, especially since 
firms frequently pay late, a charge for late payment can be included implicitly in the price of a 
product. In fact, Howorth and Reber (2003) find no evidence that firms, which are categorized 
as habitual late payers, would take advantage of the lax late payment penalty practices. On the 
contrary, they find that habitual late payment is used at the high cost in the form of forgone 
discounts by companies, which have more difficulties obtaining finance than companies 
always or frequently paying on time. This result supports the suggestion that trade credit 
comes behind institutional borrowing in the ‘pecking order’. 
Studies on less-developed financial markets also support the substitution of formal credit to 
trade credit. Ge and Qiu’s (2007) compare state owned and non-state owned firms in China 
and find non-state owned firms, which have limited access to bank credit, obtain more trade 
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credit than state owned firms. They also show this higher use of trade credit is primarily for 
financing rather than transactional purposes.  
Frank and Maksimovic (2005) suggest that in developing economies, where credit is scarce, it 
may be efficient for suppliers to act as financial intermediaries. The buyer must raise more 
than the seller to finance the transaction since the buyer needs to raise both the production 
costs  and  the  seller’s  profit.  When  extending  trade  credit,  the  seller  only  needs  to  raise  the  
production costs and the profit-component can be self-financed. Fisman and Love (2003) 
offer further evidence that trade credit has an important role in developing markets. They 
show that in countries with weaker financial institutions, industries with higher trade credit 
financing exhibit higher growth. 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (2001) study also links the development of a country’s 
banking  system and  legal  infrastructure  with  the  use  of  trade  credit.  Their  results  show that  
firms  rely  more  on  trade  credit  relative  to  bank  credit  in  inefficient  legal  systems.  The  
researchers explain that the suppliers have a comparative advantage to use unofficial 
mechanisms for extracting payment. They also find that the development of the banking 
system and the use of trade credit are complements rather than substitutes. This seems to 
imply that non-financial firms need a somewhat functioning financial system in order to act as 
financial intermediaries.  
2.3. Trade Credit Channel 
While the transaction motive suggests the use of trade credit is stable over time, the financing 
motive, and the following substitution of institutional borrowing and trade credit, imply trade 
credit may have a varying role through time, depending on the availability and price of other 
sources of financing.  
The bank lending channel theory argues that during tight money periods, i.e. monetary 
contractions, banks restrict lending to some firms, thus reducing their desired investment 
independently of interest rates (Nilsen, 2002). Banks tend to cut off lending to firms facing 
high agency costs (flight to quality) and thus downturns differentially affect the real economic 
activity of high-agency-cost borrowers (Bernanke et al., 1996). The informational frictions, 
that add to the cost of external finance, apply mainly to younger firms, firms with high degree 
of idiosyncratic risk and firms that are not well collateralized (Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994). 
These high-agency-cost borrowers, which are more likely to be credit rationed, are on average 
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smaller firms (e.g. Meltzer, 1960; Gertler & Gilchrist, 1993, 1994; Oliner & Rudebusch, 
1996). 
Meltzer (1960) was the first to show that when money is tightened, firms with relatively large 
cash balances increase the average length of time for which trade credit is extended. This 
seems to favour the firms against whom bank credit rationing is said to discriminate. When 
the shock that causes the premium to rise for firms dependent on banks does not raise the cost 
of financing as much for firms providing the trade credit, a trade credit channel might be a 
substitute for the bank lending channel (Kohler et al., 2000). Although this proposition has 
later been contested (e.g. Gertler & Gilchrist, 1993; Oliner & Rudebusch, 1996), several 
studies have also found supporting evidence. Ramey (1992), for example, studies the 
fluctuations in money and trade credit and finds that they are negatively related in both the 
short and long run. Nilsen’s (2002) study shows that small firms increase their use of trade 
credit during contractionary monetary policy episodes. But Nilsen finds also large firms 
increase their trade credit obtained. When studying large firms in more detail, he finds that 
firms without a bond rating, firms that are cash rich and firms lacking collateralizable assets 
use trade credit similarly to small firms. This result implies not only small firms but also some 
large ones are potentially credit rationed and lack other financing alternatives to trade credit.  
Nilsen’s (2002) evidence that cash-rich firms use more trade credit is slightly puzzling and in 
contradiction with findings in certain other studies (e.g. Ramey, 1992; Love et al., 2007). 
Nilsen hypothesizes that firms may hold large cash reserves as a precaution because they lack 
access to the financial market and that they are also likely to have more volatile cash flows. 
His explanation is consistent with the findings of Calomiris et al. (1994), which suggest that 
in contrast to high credit quality commercial paper issuers, lower quality firms face financing 
constraints that lead them to accumulate ‘buffer stocks’ of liquid assets. They also find 
evidence that commercial paper is used to finance accounts receivable at the onset of a 
recession, and that firms with better access to short-term credit provide financing to lower 
quality  firms,  when  the  latter  are  hit  with  an  unanticipated  increase  in  inventories  due  to  a  
change in the business cycle.     
The problem with the studies done in the U.S. is  the lack of firm level data for small  firms. 
Most researchers either concentrate on large firms or use a semi-aggregate data from the 
quarterly financial reports (QRF) published by the U.S. Census Bureau, which categorizes 
firms based on their asset size. Mateut et al. (2006) study firm-level data from British firms in 
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1990-1999. They show that during tight monetary policy, bank loans decline in absolute and 
relative terms and trade credit increases. They also find that it is the small firms that are 
excluded from bank loans and resort to trade credit. These results hold even when they take 
into account the effects of solvency, firm age, credit rating, sales and demand side effects. De 
Blasio (2005) studies Italian manufacturing firms. His study shows that firms substitute bank 
finance with trade credit during monetary tightening, but also that this substitution effect is 
small and the use of trade credit should primarily be explained with time invariant transaction 
motives.  
Most of the studies on the use of trade credit as a substitute for bank financing in developed 
financial systems concentrate on the changes in trade credit use during monetary contractions. 
However, central bank money tightening does not represent the most severe source of 
reduction in the supply of money. Taketa and Udell (2007) study lending channels in small 
and medium size firms during the Japanese financial crisis. Their results show both trade 
credit and short-term bank credit increasing during the crisis1, and thus offer some evidence 
that, against their hypothesis, trade credit and financial institution lending are complements 
rather than substitutes during a financial crisis. They can however only study the phenomenon 
in the balance as their data is aggregated in three size groups. They thus cannot study whether 
the use of trade or bank credit during a crisis depends on the financial characteristics of 
individual firms or show that the two are truly complements (i.e. that same firms increase 
both their use of trade and bank credit).  
Love et al. (2007) study the effects of financial crises on trade credit in six emerging 
economies, mainly in Asia. They find an increase in the amount of trade credit obtained and 
provided immediately after the crisis. Interestingly, they also find that after the early stages of 
the crisis, the provision of trade credit contracts in the following months and years. Their 
sample only includes the largest firms in each country, but their results suggest firms that are 
likely to be more vulnerable to the crises (in terms of liquidity and reliance on short-term 
bank debt) extend less trade credit to their customers. They argue that the decline in the 
aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply, rather than demand, of 
trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch.    
                                               
1 There is some dispute whether the banking crisis in Japan was accompanied by a credit crunch. Local market 
peculiarities and government actions during the crisis may have prevented a credit crunch, even though the 
banking sector was in crisis, or the credit crunch may have been limited to the private banking sector while the 
public sector increased lending, cancelling out the private sector crunch in the aggregate (Taketa & Udell, 2007).  
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A profound complexity in studying the use of trade credit is the difficulty to detect demand 
driven causal relationships from supply driven causalities. From the theoretical perspective it 
is easy to argue for an increased demand of trade credit by firms that become credit rationed 
by banks during a tight money period. But studies on the trade credit channel rarely explicitly 
state, why firms with continued access to institutional financing increase their provision of 
trade  credit  to  customers.  The  tacit  assumption  is  that  firms  use  their  financial  strength  to  
support profitable business opportunities.  
Even though the trade credit channel theory depicts firms as financial intermediaries, it does 
not discuss the risk-reward relationship that firms need to consider when they provide 
financing. Pike and Cheng’s (2001) survey study on large U.K. firms shows that the 
overriding goal of the credit function in firms (77% of respondents) is to minimize risk, 
particularly in terms of protecting accounts receivables. Other goals, such as profits and sales, 
are generally viewed as of secondary importance. Both times of monetary contractions and 
financial crises tend to coexist with increased probability of customer’s default. This may lead 
to a reduced supply of trade credit even if the seller has financial resources to provide it.  
The reduction in the willingness to provide trade credit could potentially be scaled up by the 
often simultaneously reducing possibilities to transfer credit risk to third parties through credit 
insurance or factoring. Especially trade credit insurance is a widely used risk management 
tool, for example 38% of respondents in Pike and Cheng’s (2001) study employ trade credit 
insurance regularly while 5% enter into factoring or invoice discounting arrangements. 
However, the study only includes large firms, which are on average less likely to use factors 
than smaller firms (Summers and Wilson, 2000). In the U.K. more than 40,000 companies 
used invoice discounting or factoring services in 2008. A year earlier there were 13,700 credit 
insurance  policies  covering  turnover  equivalent  of  10%  of  the  country’s  GDP  (Bank  of  
England, 2009a).  
Tsuruta (2007) offers empirical evidence that when non-financial firms act as financial 
intermediaries, the market exhibits similar phenomena than traditional financial markets. At 
times when credit contagion is a problem, if a firm suffers from an unanticipated liquidity 
shock and defaults, the effect of the shock spreads to the firms that have financial claims on 
the defaulting firm. Tsuruta’s (2007) study on Japanese companies shows that during a 
recession, suppliers reduce trade credit more for manufacturing firms with high trade 
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receivables irrespective of how risky the firms otherwise are. Knowing this some firms may 
become more cautions in their provision of trade credit during uncertain economic periods. 
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3. A Brief Overview of Trade Credit Use in the U.K. 
This  study  focuses  on  the  use  of  trade  credit  in  the  U.K.  during  the  recent  financial  crisis.  
Before presenting the hypotheses, which are based on the theory and existing empirical 
evidence of the trade credit channel, the trade credit practices in the U.K. are briefly described 
as well as some indicative implications of the recent financial crisis on trade credit. 
Trade  credit  is  very  widely  used  in  the  U.K.  with  a  common estimate  being  that  more  than  
80% of daily ’business to business’ transactions are on credit terms. Trade receivables is one 
of the main assets on most corporate balance sheets, representing up to 30-35% of total assets, 
on average, for all companies. Predominantly, the payment period specified is 30 days (net 30 
days or 30 from the end of month), but it can vary from less than seven days to over 120 days. 
(Wilson & Summers, 2002).  
However, the effective trade credit period is on average significantly longer than the specified 
payment period. Pike and Cheng’s (2001) survey study on 154 large firms in the U.K. shows 
that although normal credit terms are 30 days, cash collection period is typically between 45 
and 60 days. Wilson and Summers’ (2002) survey on 500 small companies concludes that on 
average 40% of invoices are paid late, but less than 10% of suppliers enforce interest charges 
on late payments. The lenient attitude towards late payment is not restricted to small 
companies with potentially weak bargaining and enforcement power, since only 44% of the 
large companies surveyed by Pike and Cheng (2001) had ever exercised their right to charge 
interest on overdue debts and just 3% exercised interest charges as a standard practice. This is 
even though two-thirds of the respondents incorporate the right to charge interest within their 
standard credit conditions.  
The surveys also show firms sometimes adjust payment terms based on their customers. 
Although approximately 80% of the firms in Pike & Cheng’s (2001) study offer trade credit 
to virtually all customers, almost half of them regularly require high-risk companies to pay 
prior-delivery, either in full or in part. Wilson and Summers’ (2002) results indicate that the 
greatest motivation for varying credit terms is related to credit being used as a competitive 
tool (i.e. attracting and retaining customers and new large orders or contracts). They also find 
that  another  important  motivation  to  vary  credit  terms  is  to  improve  cash  flows  or  to  help  
existing customers through cash-flow difficulties.  
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In the U.K., suppliers can include a Retention of Title clause in the sales contract, allowing 
them to  reclaim all  the  goods  supplied  on  credit  in  case  of  bankruptcy,  as  long  as  they  are  
distinguishable from other suppliers’ goods (Fabbri & Menichini, 2010). From the small firms 
surveyed, 50% retain ownership of goods until they are paid for, but only 22% indicated that 
they would reclaim goods in the event of default (Wilson & Summers, 2002). 
To my knowledge, no scientific research exists to date of the impact of the financial crisis to 
the use of trade credit in the U.K. However, a credit insurance company Atradius has 
published several survey results on the resent payment behaviour of companies. The Agents 
of Bank of England have also conducted survey studies with partial relevance to trade credit 
use during the crisis.  
In the Winter 2008/2009, firms were asked how much access to financing affects the ability 
of their customers to pay and to estimate the same five years earlier. The results for U.K. 
respondents show that access to financing had clearly grown in importance. When only 10% 
of respondents said the factor had a significant impact five years earlier, 26% were of the 
opinion in the turn of 2009. On the other end, only 28% viewed the accessibility of financing 
to play no or only a small role in their customers’ ability to pay, while a high 62% held the 
opinion five years earlier. In a recession firms are more likely to face cash-flow constraints, 
for example because it takes longer than expected to sell stocks.  Consequently another major 
factor that had grown in importance in the survey responses was customers’ cash flows. At 
the time of the survey, 46% estimated cash flows to have a significant impact on the 
customers’ ability to pay, while only 24% held the same view five years earlier (Atradius, 
2009a). 
The survey results highlight how the credit conditions in the end of 2008 and early 2009 were 
out  of  ordinary.  However,  it  is  less  clear,  how  this  affected  firms’  use  of  trade  credit.  In  a  
survey conducted in August 2009, 38% of U.K. respondents replied that the economic crisis 
had no effect  on how business was made in regards to sales on credit  terms. The rest  of the 
responses were divided, 37% saying the crisis had caused an increase in the sales on credit 
while 28% had witnessed a decrease. Approximately half of the same companies had seen no 
change in the availability of credit from their own suppliers, while 26% said there had been an 
increase and 23% mentioned a decrease (Atradius, 2009b).  
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The survey responses show some evidence that firms became more cautious of whom to 
extend trade credit during the crisis. Almost half of the U.K. firms had increased the 
frequency they review buyers’ creditworthiness and 44% had began using or were 
considering using advance payments to minimize risk of payment default (Atradius, 2009b).   
Bank of England (2008b) reported in late 2008 that companies were finding it difficult to 
protect themselves against the risks associated with extending credit to their trading partners. 
A survey on about 300 firms from a range of firm sizes shows trade credit insurance is very 
widely viewed as relevant to business, and almost half reported a tighter credit insurance 
environment. A substantial minority of the respondents also claimed the time taken to receive 
payment for goods and services had increased and around 45% reported some increase in bad 
debts. Firms were responding to these changes in trade credit quality and availability of 
insurance together with tighter short-term bank financing mainly by cutting back on capital 
expenditure and focussing on cash management. An interesting detail is that about a quarter 
of the respondents had refused orders as a direct result of tighter working capital. 
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4. Hypotheses 
This study seeks to answer two key questions. First, does the use of trade credit change when 
bank lending is limited? And second, does the firm’s vulnerability to the crisis affect the 
change in the use of trade credit? Three hypotheses arise from the previous literature and are 
discussed in this chapter. The hypotheses are based on the trade credit channel theory, as 
existing research on trade credit use during financial crises is still extremely limited. 
There are differences in research settings, which may affect the results to differ from the 
earlier  studies.  Love  et  al.  (2007)  already  show  that  the  results  obtained  from  times  of  
monetary contraction may not apply to more severe credit crunches during financial crises. 
But although this study is similar to Love et al.’s (2007) in the respect the research period 
covers a financial crisis, the studies differ in other aspects, which may influence the results. 
First, the most important contribution of this study in relation to Love et al.’s (2007) work is a 
firm-level data, which includes not only large but also small companies. The abundance of 
previous studies, which emphasize the different standing of large and small firms during 
tighter credit conditions, underscore that in order to observe the phenomenon in full, the data 
needs to be versatile in terms of firm size.   
Second, Love et al. (2007) study the use of trade credit in emerging markets which have less 
developed financial and legal systems than the U.K. Earlier literature suggests trade credit 
plays a smaller role relative to bank credit in countries with developed financial and legal 
institutions. When bank credit is limited, the elasticity of trade credit might not be as high as 
in countries where trade creditors in general have a greater financing advantage. There are no 
prior studies from developed financial markets under a period of such a severe credit crunch 
as has been witnessed recently, and thus no direct point of comparison exists.  
A third, and a more arbitrary difference in the research settings is that during the financial 
crises in Love et al.’s (2007) study, the problems were limited to one or a few countries. As 
their  data  includes  only  large  and  publicly  traded  firms,  this  makes  their  results  of  the  
decreasing provision of trade credit even more puzzling. The best of the firms in their sample 
may not only be less affected by the domestic crisis, but also have access to international 
financial markets, which could limit their exposure to the credit crunch in the domestic 
market. The large companies are also likely to trade with foreign companies, and although 
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highly speculative, the results by Love et al. (2007), which show trade credit provided 
decreases in the aftermath of the crisis while trade credit obtained does not, could point to a 
trade credit channel from abroad. During the research period of this study, the crisis was 
global, or at least affected all the financial markets the firms in the sample would have access 
to, and where their possible important foreign trade partners would operate in. This could 
cause the effects of the crisis to be even more severe, and to touch a wider set of firms. As the 
trade credit channel is based on financially unconstrained firms intermediating bank credit to 
their constrained customers, an extensive credit crunch could potentially prevent the trade 
credit channel from working. This could explain why survey studies during the crisis in the 
U.K.  do  not  indicate  any  evidence  of  a  trade  credit  channel  (Atradius,  2009b;  Bank  of  
England, 2008b). 
Notwithstanding the doubts presented above, the following hypotheses are based on the 
traditional propositions of the trade credit channel theory and the existing empirical evidence. 
H1. In a financial crisis, firms both provide more trade credit to their customers and obtain 
more trade credit from their suppliers. 
The first hypothesis stems from several earlier studies (e.g. Nilsen, 2002; Mateut et al., 2006), 
which test how monetary contractions affect the use of trade credit. The findings by Love et 
al. (2007) imply the results may be more intriguing than the hypothesis suggests. Their results 
would suggest that at the wake of the crisis, both trade credit provided and received increase, 
but that trade credit provided later decreases as the crisis continues. The researchers argue this 
is caused by a reduction in the supply rather than the demand for trade credit financing. They 
claim that at some point in a crisis, bank lending is cut to the extent that its redistribution 
through the trade credit channel no longer works. 
Even though it is not possible to pinpoint the causal effects in the supply or demand side2, it is 
possible to reveal implications to one way or another. These implications are likely to arise 
when the second research question, concerning how the vulnerability to the financial crisis 
affects the use of trade credit, is addressed.     
H2. Firms with higher vulnerability to a financial crisis obtain relatively more trade credit 
from their suppliers during the crisis than firms, which are less vulnerable. 
                                               
2 See Chapter 5.3 for discussion on the supply and demand side dependence. 
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This hypothesis is based on the bank lending channel theory and the idea of bank credit and 
trade credit as substitutes. Firm size and liquidity are tested as a proxy for firm’s vulnerability 
to the financial crisis. Small firms are likely to face higher agency-costs in bank lending and 
thus be bank credit rationed during a crisis. Firms, which rely heavily on short-term bank 
loans or have a weaker liquidity, are more dependent on bank financing, which increases their 
vulnerability to the crisis.   
H3. Firms, which are less vulnerable to a financial crisis, provide relatively more trade credit 
to their customers during the crisis than firms with higher vulnerability.   
Meltzer (1960) was the first to suggest the third hypothesis already in the 1960’s. He finds 
that firms with large cash balances are more likely to increase net trade credit (defined as 
trade receivables net of payables) faster than sales when monetary policy is tight. The story 
behind the hypothesis is that firms with better access to bank credit or strong liquidity work as 
financial intermediaries during a crisis channelling financing to the weaker firms in the form 
of trade credit. Although this is an antithesis to the second hypothesis, the sample in this study 
does  not  form  a  closed  system,  and  thus  the  two  hypotheses  do  not  automatically  hold  in  
tandem. Different measures of the vulnerability to a crisis may also explain the changes in the 
provision and obtaining of trade credit during the crisis. 
Table 1 summarizes the expected relationships between trade credit and the explanatory 
variables under interest. 
Table 1.  Hypotheses
Independent variable Trade credit obtained Trade credit provided
Year 2007 + +
Year 2008 + +/-
Firm size during the crisis - +
Liquidity during the crisis - +
Dependent variable
The table summarizes the hypothesized relationships between dependent and independent variables. The hypotheses are
based on the theory and prior empirical evidence of the trade credit channel. The possible negative relationship of the year
2008 and trade credit provided follows the findings of Love et al. (2007).  
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5. Methodology 
The interest of this thesis is in changes in firms’ use of trade credit during a financial crisis. In 
order  to  study  this,  the  data  needs  to  be  two-dimensional,  i.e.  contain  observations  on  N  
different firms at T different time points. This type of data is called a panel data, or sometimes 
a longitudinal data or a cross-sectional time-series data. 
Panel data may have group effects, time effects, or both. The emphasis of this study is in the 
within-firm variation, and thus the interest is in the group effects. The effects may be either 
fixed or random. We can make theoretical assumptions about the nature of the effects, but the 
best thing to do is to test that the model fits the data. Chapter 5.1 discusses the panel 
regression model and the difference between fixed and random effects. 
A typical challenge with panel data models is that they are often plagued with 
misspecifications. As the data has both cross-sectional and time series dimensions, the model 
can suffer from both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. If either of these is present, and 
not corrected for, the results become unreliable. Testing for and correcting heterscedasticity 
and autocorrelation in panel data models is discussed in Chapter 5.2.  
While the first two sub-chapters are introduction to panel regression methodology in general, 
Chapter 5.3 explains the regression equations in this study that are employed to model the use 
of  trade  credit  during  the  recent  financial  crisis  in  the  U.K.  The  methodology  in  this  study  
mainly follows the one used by Love at al. (2007). 
5.1. Fixed Effects Panel Regression 
Panel  data  has  a  set  of  units,  e.g.  firms  (i  =  1,…,N),  each  of  which  are  measured  at  two or  
more points in time (t = 1,…., T). A basic framework of the panel regression model is: 
y it ? ? ? ?x it ? ? i ? ? it ,                    (1) 
where ? is  an  intercept,  x  is  a  vector  of  variables  that  vary  over  time  and  ? is a vector of 
coefficients. The two error terms ? and ? behave somewhat differently. There is a different 
idiosyncratic error term ? for each unit at each point in time but ? only varies across the units. 
Thus ? is treated as the combined effect on y of all unobserved variables that are constant 
over time. 
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There are three different types of effects, which determine the appropriate panel regression 
model. Pooled model is the most restrictive. It assumes no unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, i.e. ? is constant for all units. As such it ignores the panel characteristics of the 
data, and a pooled model can be solved with basic ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
Theoretically a pooled model can be discarded as unsuitable for this study since it would 
require all firm-specific characteristics that are relatively stable over the research period (e.g. 
industry and characteristics of customer relationships) to have no effect on the use of trade 
credit.  
The two other models, fixed effects and random effects, assume the existence of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. Their difference is that the fixed effects model treats the unobserved 
individual specific variable as partially correlated with the observed regressors, while random 
effect  models  treat  it  as  independently  distributed  of  the  regressors.  Thus,  the  fixed  effects  
methodology allows for any correlation between x and ?. The inclusion of such correlation 
makes it possible to claim the fixed effects model controls for time-invariant unobservables. 
This property is perhaps the most important advantage in fixed effects models, because it 
makes it possible to control for all possible characteristics of the firms in a sample without 
measuring them, just as long as those characteristics do not change over time. 
Fixed effect estimators are always consistent, but not necessarily the most efficient. 
Hausman’s  (1978)  specification  test  is  typically  used  to  find  out  whether  the  more  efficient  
random effects estimation also yields consistent results. If there is heteroskedasticity in the 
error terms, Hausman’s test is invalid, but a test of overidentifying restrictions can be used to 
test for fixed vs. random effects (see Arellano, 1993). In the special case of homoskedastic 
errors, the test statistic is asymptotically equal to the Hausman specification test.  
The trade credit model specifications are tested for overidentifying restrictions. With a few 
exceptions mostly in the simplest models, the Sargan-Hansen test statistics supports using the 
fixed effects model. Since the fixed effects are always consistent, the method is employed in 
all estimations. Using random effects for those models for which the test for overidentifying 
restrictions proves it suitable, would not affect the interpretation of the results.  
There are two ways to estimate the fixed effects model, the least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV)  estimation  and  the  mean  deviated  model  (also  known  as  within  effects).  LSDV  is  
perhaps intuitively more comprehensible as it is simply an OLS model, which includes N-1 
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dummy variables to distinguish the units in the data set. However, the estimation is 
computationally too expensive to run with large data sets. Thus in this study the fixed effects 
regressions are estimated using the mean deviated model:  
y it ? y t ? y ? ? ? ?(x it ? x i ? x) ? ?it ? ??i ? ? ? ??,                  (2) 
where y t ,  x t and ??t  are the averages of y it ,  x it and ? it within i and y, x, ? and ??are the grand 
averages of y it ,  x it ,  ? itand ? i . The LSDV and mean deviated model produce identical 
coefficient estimates and standard errors, but the measure of the overall explanatory power 
(R-squared) of the mean deviated model is deflated, and as such it is not reported in this 
study. 
The problem with the fixed effects model is that most variables have both within- and 
between-unit variation. The relative magnitude of these determines the standard errors of the 
coefficients. Using the fixed effects model eliminates all of the between-unit variation and 
focuses on the within-unit changes. Thus, Fixed effects model is inefficient in estimating the 
effect of variables that have very little within variance, and it does not allow the estimation of 
time-invariant variables at all (Plümper & Troeger, 2007). 
5.2. Cluster Robust Error Terms 
Panel data models assume the error terms are homoskedastic (i.e. the estimated variance of 
the error terms is not dependent on the values of the independent variables) and serially 
uncorrelated (i.e. the error terms are not correlated with their own lagged values). However, 
this assumption is often violated in practice, which can lead to incorrect inference if the 
misspecification is not corrected. A modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity can 
be used to test if the residuals of a fixed effects regression model are heteroskedastic across 
units (Baum, 2001). A Wooldridge test is suitable for testing for serial correlation in panel 
data models. Drukker (2003) shows that the test has good size and power properties even 
when there is heteroskedasticity in the idiosyncratic error terms, the data is unbalanced and 
there are gaps in the individual series. 
If there is heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation, the estimators are still consistent but 
inefficient, and standard errors are biased. More specifically, the error terms can be severely 
deflated, resulting in Type I error (i.e. rejection of the null hypothesis when it is actually true). 
The misspecifications can be controlled by assuming ‘clustered errors’, i.e. that observations 
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within group i are correlated in some unknown way, but that groups i and j do not have 
correlated errors. This is often a reasonable assumption if units are randomly selected. Using 
clustered errors does not require knowledge about the dependence structure of observations 
within clusters. It allows the variance to be heteroskedastic, both within and between clusters, 
and it also allows for an arbitrary dependence structure among observations within a cluster 
(Williams, 2000; Wooldridge, 2003).  
5.3. Statistical Models and Variables 
This chapter focuses on the regression models used to study the potential change in the use of 
trade credit during a financial crisis. It also explains all variables included in the models. For 
clarity, a list of the variables is provided in Appendix A. 
The research period ranges from 2004 to 2008. Years 2007 and 2008 are considered crisis 
years and the previous years are included to represent normality. One observation represents 
one firm in one year and crisis years are included in the study as binary variables. The interest 
is on the use of trade credit during the crisis years compared to its use during normal times. 
This difference is studied using the fixed effects regression with clustered errors. 
5.3.1. Trade Credit Measures 
The dependent variables are trade credit provided (TCP), trade credit obtained (TCO) and net 
trade credit (NTC). Trade credit provided is measured as trade receivables per sales, and trade 
credit payables per cost of goods sold (COGS) indicate obtained trade credit. The ratios 
cannot be directly interpreted. They are likely to capture both the percentage of goods sold or 
purchased on credit and the time for which credit is extended or received.  
The third dependent variable is of less interest. It measures firms net trade credit, which is the 
difference between trade receivables and payables scaled by sales. The ratio reflects firms’ 
relative willingness to extend trade credit net of the credit they receive themselves. Thus 
when a firm’s NTC increases (decreases), it is providing more (less) trade credit to its 
customers relative to the trade credit it receives from its suppliers. Trade credit theories do not 
explicitly speak of net trade credit although the first study on trade credit channel (Meltzer, 
1960) measured trade credit in net terms. At the aggregate it is unclear, how the theory 
predicts a crisis should affect the measure. Since firms are expected to increase both the trade 
credit they provide and obtain, the net result may be insignificant. However, we can imply 
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from the logic of the trade credit channel, that NTC should decrease (increase) for firms, 
which are (not) vulnerable to tight money periods.  
Scaling short-term stock measures with flow measures can cause bias to the ratios, especially 
when the variables are from annual data. If the trend in sales or purchases has been 
significantly increasing or decreasing during the accounting year, the whole year flow figures 
may not represent the scale of operations at the end of the year. If the trend has been 
downwards (upwards), the trade credit variables may be skewed downwards (upwards). There 
is naturally likely to be between-firm variation in the growth trend during a year, but bias in 
relatively rare individual measures is not likely to reflect itself in the regression results. In 
relation to the sample as a whole, the potential bias in the trade credit measures is mostly of 
concern for the year 2008. The U.K. went into a recession in the second half of the year. 
While the country’s GDP grew 0.7% during the whole year, the economy shrank 1.8% in the 
fourth quarter compared to the respective period a year before (IMF, 2009). Thus the 
likelihood of a dominant decreasing growth trend during 2008 is potentially large enough to 
bias the trade credit measures. 
Interpreting trade credit provided and obtained is not straightforward. There are always two 
sides of trade credit, supply and demand. Based on data from financial statements, it is 
impossible to know for sure which side is causing the discovered patterns in the use of trade 
credit.  Even  if  the  results  show  the  provision  of  trade  credit  increases,  it  can  be  caused  by  
firms actually selling more on credit or providing longer credits or their customers increasing 
the time until payments are made while the actual credit terms stay constant. The same goes 
for increases in the trade credit obtained. It can be a result of a greater demand for trade credit 
financing or increase in the provision of trade credit by the suppliers. If firms become more 
reluctant to offer trade credit following a bank credit crunch, it may or may not show in the 
statistical tests depending on how their customers simultaneously adjust their use of trade 
credit financing.  
5.3.2. Aggregate Patterns 
Trade credit is first studied in the aggregate. Theories suggest there are a number of possible 
explanations for the general use of trade credit. Fortunately, causal variables that are either 
time-invariant or slowly changing over time (e.g. industry) should be captured in the firm 
fixed effects.  
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To control for possible causal variables that can vary significantly over time, three3 variables 
are included in the models to control for liquidity and size. The literature suggests trade credit 
comes behind internally generated funds in the pecking order, and thus cash-rich firms are 
likely to rely less on trade credit. They might also be willing to extend more trade credit to 
their own customers. Two proxies for liquidity are considered; cash flows scaled with assets 
(LIQ1) and the ratio of cash balance to assets at the beginning of the year (LIQ2). The 
statements of cash flows are available for only a minority of the firms in the sample, and thus 
cash flows are estimated as the sum of net income and depreciation for all firms. 
Firm size can also influence the use of trade credit. Petersen and Rajan (1997) find larger 
firms obtaining significantly more trade credit than smaller firms, which is likely to be caused 
by transaction motives. It is less certain to which direction size affects trade credit provision. 
Smaller firms may provide more trade credit to their customers, because they are more likely 
to suffer from the problems arising from asymmetric information. On the other hand size 
gives firms economies of scale in receivable monitoring and collection and can add 
controlling power, which could decrease the costs of providing trade credit. Thus size can be 
hypothesized both to decrease and increase the provision of trade credit depending on which 
motive dominates.  
Size changes only slowly through time, and thus it should be captured in firm fixed effects. 
As size is  still  not in fact  constant,  it  is  included in the model as a control variable.  If  it  has 
very little within-firm variation, it should show up statistically insignificant. Because of the 
wide range in firm size in the sample, size is measured as the logarithm of total assets (SIZE). 
                                               
3 Previous literature has found also other time-variant factors to influence the use of trade credit. As suggested 
by Atanasova and Wilson (2003), the demand for trade credit may depend on the presence of growth 
opportunities, which can be assumed to increase with sales growth. Growth opportunities are also likely to be 
lower for larger firms (Petersen & Rajan, 1997), and firm size is included as a control variable. Another factor, 
which may affect the demand for trade credit, is based on the maturity matching approach suggested in finance 
literature. Firms with more short-term assets are assumed to have a higher demand for short-term credit in 
general and trade credit in particular (Anatasova & Wilson, 2003). Firms’ logarithmic sales growth, lagged 
logarithmic sales growth and ratio of short-term assets to total assets have been statistically tested, but the 
variables are not significant in any of the models, and have thus been dropped from the final regressions.  
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As  the  growth  trends  of  firms’  business  volume  within  each  year  are  not  known,  firms’  
logarithmic sales growth rate (LSG) is added to the regression models. The proxy is not 
perfect as a certain growth rate can be measured both for a firm, which has a very steady 
growth during the year, and thus unbiased trade credit measures, and for a firm with either 
decreasing or increasing growth trend, and thus biased TCO and TCP ratios. However, the 
purpose of the variable is primarily to control the possible general downward bias in the trade 
credit measures in 2008, and for this reason LSG is included in interaction with the crisis year 
binary variables as a proxy of the growth trend4. The underlying assumption is that the turn in 
the overall economic activity was so severe during 2008 that it is at least partly reflected in 
the whole year growth figures. 
The model for aggregate patterns is as follows: 
TCit ? (u ? ai) ? b1CYt ? b2LSGit ? b3X it ? eit ,                  (3) 
where TC is one of the three trade credit measures described earlier, u is the estimated 
intercept, a is the estimated firm fixed effects, CY is a vector of the two crisis year dummy 
variables, LSG is a vector of logarithmic sales growth during the crisis years, X is a vector of 
the liquidity variables and size, and e is the estimated idiosyncratic error term. 
5.3.3. Cross-Sectional Patterns  
To understand what is driving the aggregate patterns, it is necessary to study firms’ 
heterogeneous responses to the crisis. To do this, the use of trade credit is studied relative to 
the firm’s vulnerability to the financial crisis. The most often used proxy for this vulnerability 
is  firm size.  Liquidity  is  also  used  to  test  the  robustness  of  the  results  and  to  possibly  gain  
understanding of the causal effects, i.e. are the aggregate patterns driven more by the supply 
or demand side effects and is there evidence supporting the trade credit channel theory5.  
                                               
4 Logarithmic sales growth rate has also been tested as an independent control variable, but the estimated 
coefficients are statistically insignificant (see previous footnote). 
5 Reliance on short-term debt (measured as short-term bank loans per assets), collateralizable assets (fixed assets 
per assets), logarithm of firm age and logarithmic age squared (due to previous findings that the relationship may 
be unlinear) have also been tested as proxies for access to bank credit, but due to their lack of statistical 
significance, the results are not reported. The effect of stock exchange listing has also been tested by running 
separate regressions for the sub-samples of quoted and unquoted firms, but the difference between the groups is 
trivial, and the results are not reported. 
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The proxies for the vulnerability to the financial crisis (VFC) are included in the model in 
interaction  with  the  crisis  year  dummies  to  analyze  their  effect  in  a  given  year.  The  model  
thus becomes: 
TCit ? (u ? ai) ? b1CYt ? b2VFC it ? b3LSGit ? b4 X it ? eit ,                 (4) 
where VFC is one of the three proxies for the financial vulnerability.  
First  and  most  often  used  measure  of  agency  costs,  which  affects  firm’s  access  to  bank  
funding, is firm size, which is measured as the logarithm of total assets (SIZE). Second, 
several researchers have suggested that what really matters during tight money periods for 
bank-dependent firms, is the amount of liquidity the firms have. Firms with large cash 
holdings or an ability to generate cash flows have a cushion to rely on during a financial 
crisis. Thus they are less vulnerable to the crisis even if they are credit rationed. The argument 
goes, liquidity-rich firms are also in a better financial position to extend more trade credit to 
their customers during the crisis and perhaps use trade credit terms as a means of supporting 
profitable commercial operations. The same liquidity proxies (LIQ1 and LIQ2) that were 
discussed earlier are used as a second and third measure of the vulnerability to the crisis.  
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6. Data 
Ideally the data would have firm-level observations from firms with a large range in size on a 
quarterly basis. Unfortunately there is no data set that meets all the criteria. The frequency of 
data is compromised, and the sample contains annual firm-level data from both large and 
small firms that is available from the U.K. 
The data is obtained from Orbis database. Unlike most of the other databases available, Orbis 
includes annual accounts also for small and unlisted firms. Following the research tradition, 
the sample includes only manufacturing firms. Firms are also excluded from the sample, if 
they are unlikely to have independent financing (i.e. majority owned by other firms), or if 
their accounting year ends more than +/- 3 months from the calendar year end during the 
crisis years or 2006.  
Data availability also restricts the sample. Only firms, which have data for at least one of the 
trade credit measures for at least one crisis and one pre-crisis year and total asset data for 
2006 are included. Outliers have been treated in two ways. Following Love at al. (2007), all 
measures of trade credit provided and obtained above one have been eliminated as 
unreliable6.  This  still  does  not  effectively  eliminate  outliers  from  the  data,  and  thus  for  all  
variables included in the statistical analyses, outliers falling to the lowest and highest 5% of 
normal distribution are recoded to the 90% confidence limits of the two-tailed distribution. 
Consequently 5.58% of observations of trade credit obtained, 6.10% of trade credit provided 
and 7.61% of net trade credit are recoded. The treatment has a modest effect to the dependent 
variable means7, but notably reduces their standard deviations8. 
The final sample includes 1,084 firms. The sample is unbalanced, i.e. all the variables are not 
measured at all the time points in all of the firms. Only approximately 66% of firms have data 
from all the five years in the research period. The sample is relatively extensive though, as a 
further 18% of firms have data from all but the first or the last year in the period. 
                                               
6 The first stage outlier elimination removes 3.27% of the observations of TCO and 0.76% of TCP. 
7 A majority of the extreme values are outside the upper confidence limit, and thus the recoding somewhat 
decreases the means. For TCO the difference is the largest, 0.88 percentage points. For TCP the difference in 
averages is 0.54 percentage points and for NTC 0.01 percentage points before and after recoding the outliers.  
8 The standard deviations decrease from 0.118 to 0.089 in case of TCO, from 0.093 to 0.070 in case of TCP and 
from 0.082 to 0.066 in case of NTC. 
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Earlier studies on trade credit use have dealt with mergers and acquisitions (M&A) either by 
adding up the independent accounts of the merged firms for the years preceding the 
acquisition or ignoring M&A all together. M&A matter in this study if the trade credit 
obtained and/or provided ratio differ in the consolidated firms and the acquired company is 
large enough in relation to the buyer for the difference to reflect in the aggregate ratio. 
Ignoring M&A is not likely to cause a significant bias. In a data, which includes small firms 
for which M&A data and the independent accounts of the firms prior to the consolidation are 
not always available, trying to add up the accounts could cause even a larger bias. Thus M&A 
are ignored.  
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
This chapter describes the sample characteristics. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of 
the continuous variables in the sample after the treatment of outliers. Trade credit payables 
represent 16.7% of COGS on average and trade receivables are on average 16.3% of sales. 
The firms are still on average net providers of trade credit, i.e. trade receivables are larger 
than trade payables in absolute value. However, the variability among firms is large. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Dependent variables:
Accounts payable / COGS (TCO) 4,228 0.167 0.089 0.000 0.152 0.370
Accounts receivable / Sales (TCP) 4,855 0.163 0.070 0.016 0.164 0.322
Net trade credit / Sales (NTC) 4,207 0.055 0.066 -0.080 0.056 0.191
Independent variables:
Cash flows /Assets (LIQ1) 4,841 0.069 0.108 -0.267 0.079 0.380
Cash balance / Assets (LIQ2) 4,533 0.110 0.120 0.000 0.063 0.392
Logarithm of total assets (SIZE) 4,882 3.162 0.472 2.891
Logarithmic sales growth (LSG) 4,510 0.081 0.208 -0.516 0.067 0.689
1.408 6.054
The table shows the descriptive statistics for all continuous variables included in the regressions. The total number of firms
in the sample is 1,084. The size variable is in millions of pound sterling and other variables are measured as fractions. 
 
Table 3 depicts the breakdown of the sample by firms’ asset size at the end of 2006 and 
industry. As mentioned in relation to sample criteria, all the firms are engaged in 
manufacturing, but the distribution across manufacturing sectors is extensive. The division of 
size groups in the table is completely arbitrary and done for illustrative purposes. 
Approximately 32% of the firms are categorized here as small (having assets less than GBP 
10 million). Circa 42% of firms fall into the mid-group of firms having assets between     
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GBP 10 and 50 million, and these are called medium-size firms hereafter. The group of large 
firms represents 26% of the sample.  
Table 3. Sample Breakdown by Industry and Size
Industry (two-digid Nace Rev. 2 code)
Manufacture of Total < 10 10-50 > 50
Electronic products and equipment (26, 27) 166 60 59 47
Petroleum, rubber, plastic and other non-metallic mineral products           
(19, 20, 22, 23)
160 45 69 46
Basic metals and metal products (24, 25) 152 56 63 33
Machinery and equipment (28, 29, 30) 141 40 53 48
Food and beverages (10, 11) 123 31 56 36
Textiles, leather and clothing (13, 14, 15) 85 30 37 18
Wood and paper products (16, 17) 68 15 32 21
Printing and recorded media (18) 44 14 23 7
Chemicals and pharmaceutical products (21) 36 10 13 13
Furnitures (31) 35 13 17 5
Other (12, 32) 74 32 34 8
Total 1,084 346 456 282
Percentage of total 31.92 % 42.07 % 26.01 %
Listed 302 62 85 155
Percentage of asset category 27.86 % 17.92 % 18.64 % 54.96 %
Unlisted 782 284 371 127
Percentage of asset category 72.14 % 82.08 % 81.36 % 45.04 %
Average number of employees in 2006 per asset category 1,808 112 289 6,094
Average age in 2006 per asset category 33 26 32 43
Assets 2006 (MGBP)
The table presents the division of the firms in the sample by industry and size as well as the frequency of publictly listed
companies and the average (mean) age and number of employees at the end of 2006. Due to the low frequency (3) of firms
in the group "Manufacture of tobacco products", these firms are reported under other manufacturing.  
The distribution of industrial representation within different size groups is remarkably even. 
Manufacturing electronic products and equipment has the highest frequency of firms within 
the small firms (17.3%). The largest sector within large firms is the manufacture of machinery 
and equipment (17.0%), but manufacturing electronic products and equipment is a very close 
second (16.7%) with the difference being only one firm. Within the medium-size firms 
manufacturing electronic products and equipment has the third highest frequency (12.9%), 
while production of non-metallic mineral products has the most extensive representation 
(15.1%).  
Less than 30% of the firms in the sample are listed either it the London Stock Exchange main 
market or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). As expected, the frequency of listed 
firms is highest in the group of large firm, and approximately half (51%) of all the listed firms 
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in the sample have assets more than GBP 50 million. There is very little difference between 
the two groups of smaller firms in terms of frequency of public listing. 
Asset size is in line with another measure of size, namely the number of employees. The 
small companies in the sample have on average 112 employees, while the large firms have 
almost 6,100. The medium-size firms fall in between, but are on average closer to the small 
firms in this aspect. Table 3 also reports how age is on average related to firm size. The small 
firms are on average 23 years younger than the large firms.  
The rest of this chapter describes the use of trade credit in the sample firms. Figure 2 presents 
four graphs illustrating trade credit use by year. The first graph on the top left corner shows 
the average of aggregate trade credit obtained and provided in the whole sample. In light of 
the trade credit channel theory, the trend lines look quite surprising. The average figures show 
no evidence that the use of trade credit increases at any point during the crisis. The figure also 
shows a clear decline in both the trade credit provided and obtained during 2008. In relation 
to the trade credit provided, these indicative findings seem to support Love at al.’s (2007) 
results of a decreasing provision of trade credit after the first year of a crisis. 
The rest of the graphs in Figure 2 present the use of trade credit by year and firm size. The 
companies have been divided into the same arbitrary asset size categories as in the earlier 
review of sample division by industries (Table 3). The two graphs on the right show the 
provision and obtaining of trade credit separately. The large firms in the sample clearly have 
more trade payables per COGS on average than firms in the two smaller categories. The 
finding is similar to an earlier result by Petersen and Rajan (1997), who report accounts 
payable per COGS are 9% for the small firms in their sample and 19% for the large firms.   
The division of trade credit obtained by size categories does not show any evidence of a trade 
credit channel. The large firms obtain slightly more trade credit on average in 2007 than 
during the previous three years, but the change is quite modest and followed by a substantial 
decrease in trade credit obtained in 2008. Based on the theory, large firms should be 
increasing their trade credit obtained less than smaller firms, but the data shows the average 
increases in 2007 only in the large firms. 
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The figure indicates opposite results on average trade receivables per sales to what Petersen 
and Rajan (1997) find. They report small firms do not only borrow less through trade credit, 
they  also  extend  less  trade  credit.  The  recent  data  from  the  U.K.  in  this  study  shows  a  
conflicting pattern. The group of smallest firms provides the most trade credit on average 
while the largest firms extend the least trade credit. This may be driven by transaction 
motives. The informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers are likely to be larger for 
small sellers, which are also younger on average, and may thus lack track record on product 
quality and reliability. As suggested by Wilson and Summers (2002) small firms are likely to 
face conflicting pressure in extending trade credit. They typically have higher cost of raising 
finance, and thus financing trade credit extension, and they have reduced opportunities to 
benefit from economies of scale. Their size can, however, put them in an asymmetric 
bargaining position vis-à-vis their customers so that customer expectation and pressure can 
drive the decision to grant trade credit and the payment terms offered. This asymmetric 
relationship is reflected in the results by Howorth and Reber (2003), which show that habitual 
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late payers are significantly larger than non-habitual late payers. The researchers hypothesize 
these firms are likely to be larger in relation to their suppliers, and thus able to take advantage 
of the sellers poor bargaining position. 
For both trade credit obtained and provided, the two categories of the smallest firms have 
very similar trade credit ratios, which also behave very similarly on average during the period 
under review. The large firms notably differ from the others on average. However, the change 
in trade credit use during the crisis is similar in all size categories. In 2008 the use of trade 
credit shows a decrease from the previous year, which is strongly in contradiction with the 
hypothesis. 
Figure 2 also presents firms net trade credit by year in the bottom left corner. In the aggregate, 
net trade credit is very stable throughout the research period. There is also no evident sign of 
a change during the crisis in any of the size categories. In 2008 net trade credit seems to have 
decreased in average in the large firms, but the decrease is not exceptional in light of the 
changes witnessed during ‘normal times’.   
Table 4. Composition of Debt Finance 2006
Type of liabilities Total < 10 10-50 > 50
Short-term liabilities (percentage of total funding) 32.29 % 48.19 % 38.22 % 32.11 %
Bank loans (percentage of short-term liabilities) 9.80 % 21.27 % 23.95 % 9.39 %
Trade credits (percentage of short-term liabilities) 33.56 % 42.65 % 41.26 % 33.32 %
Other (percentage of short-term liabilities) 56.64 % 36.08 % 34.79 % 57.29 %
Long-term liabilities (percentage of total funding) 29.79 % 14.40 % 18.29 % 30.08 %
Bank loans (percentage of long-term liabilities) 39.70 % 63.46 % 66.98 % 39.32 %
Other (percentage of long-term liabilities) 60.30 % 36.54 % 33.02 % 60.68 %
The table presents the composition of debt finance in the 1,030 firms in the sample for which data of long-term liabilities,
long-term debt, short-term liabilities, short-term debt and trade payables can be obtained from 2006. The percentages are
based on aggregate figures. The short-term and long-term liabilities are calculated as a fraction of equity and liabilities, while
the other figures are presented as a fraction of their upper category.
Assets 2006 (MGBP)
 
In relation to sales and COGS, large firms in the sample have less trade receivables and more 
trade payables on average. But in relation to assets and liabilities, small firms use more trade 
credit. At the end of the financial year 2006, trade receivables represented 30.1% of the total 
assets of small firms. The corresponding ratio was 22.9% for the medium-size firms and 
13.4% for the large firms. Table 4 reports the composition of debt financing at the same point 
in time. The figures are calculated from the aggregate values, and thus the numbers for the 
total sample are dominated by the large firms and contain little informative value. 
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The table shows small firms rely more on short-term funding than large firms.  The category 
of large firms also has notably less bank funding in relation to liabilities than the two other 
groups. This applies to both short and long-term bank loans. Trade credits represent more 
than 40% of the short-term financing of the two categories of smallest firms, which in relation 
to total debt financing translates into 20.6% for the small firms and 15.8% for the medium-
size firms. The large firms have trade payables of a relatively low 33.3% of short-term debt 
and 10.7% of total liabilities. However, trade payables still represent a much larger share of 
the firms’ financing than short-term bank debt. 
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7. Results 
The graphical illustration in the previous chapter implies the use of trade credit behaves very 
differently in a financial crisis than the trade credit channel theory predicts. It also partly 
supports Love et al.’s (2007) earlier findings on trade credit during crisis periods. Both 
ANOVA and regression analyses are employed to analyze the decrease in trade credit 
statistically. The regression analyses of the cross-sectional patterns in Chapter 7.3 also aim to 
explain what may cause the decrease in the use of trade credit.  
7.1. ANOVA Analysis of Difference in the Aggregate Means 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is some indicative evidence the first hypothesis of 
firms both extending and receiving more trade credit during a crisis, may not hold. ANOVA 
analysis for the difference in the means is first used to test the relationship statistically. 
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis, which support the indicative findings from the 
graphical description of the use of trade credit on average. Firms both provide and obtain less 
trade credit during 2008 than during the pre-crisis years. The difference in the means is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
There is no statistically significant difference between the mean trade credit used during the 
pre-crisis years and the year 2007, thus indicating no empirical evidence to support the 
preconceived characterization of the year as a crisis year. In terms of corporate financing, or 
at least trade credit, the year seems not to be different from ‘normal times’. 
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7.2. Regression of Aggregate Patterns 
Regression analyses of the aggregate patterns in the use of trade credit show robustness of the 
results  obtained  from the  ANOVA tests  of  the  difference  in  the  means.  Table  6  reports  the  
results of the regressions of Equation 3. The statistically significant Wooldridge test statistics 
imply there is autocorrelation in the error terms and the significant Wald test statistics point to 
groupwise heteroskedastiticy. The estimated error terms are corrected for clustering to control 
for the misspecifications in the models. 
All the results from the aggregate models of trade credit obtained and provided (models 1-8 in 
Table 6) clearly support the earlier findings that firms both obtain and provide less trade 
credit during 2008. The negative coefficient estimators for the binary variable 2008 are 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all the models. Year 2007 does not pre-eminently 
differ  from  the  previous  control  years,  although  models  7  and  8  show  some  signs  of  trade  
credit provision decreasing during the year. However, the estimated coefficients are small in 
size and their statistical significance is low.  
Models with even numbers include the interaction terms of sales growth and crisis year binary 
variables as proxies of the change in business volume growth trend during the year. These 
control variables are expected to have the same sign as the parameter estimates for the 
corresponding crisis year dummy variables. The variables are included to test that the 
decrease in trade credit use is not merely a consequence of a negative trend in business 
volume during the latter half of 2008, which would bias the dependent variables. 
The results show sales growth is connected with trade credit provided in 2008. The estimated 
parameter for 2007 is virtually zero and statistically insignificant, which supports the use of 
the variable as an appropriate proxy for a change in business volume growth during the year. 
The inclusion of the control variable decreases the estimated effect of the year 2008, implying 
a part of the observed aggregate decrease can be explained by the declining sales during the 
second half of 2008. However, the estimator for 2008 stays statistically significant at the 1% 
level even after controlling for the change in sales volume. Thus, there is an indication the 
turn in sales growth trend alone does not explain the decrease in trade credit provided. 
Models 3-4, 7-8 and 11-12 include the two control variables for liquidity, cash reserves and 
cash  flow,  as  well  as  firm  size.  Adding  the  controls  does  not  affect  the  estimated  year  
variables, which are of interest here. The estimated coefficients of the control variables are 
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partly surprising. Holding a larger share of assets in cash and other very liquid assets is 
associated with higher level of trade credit obtained. Calomiris et al. (1994) and Nilsen (2002) 
argue that firms facing financing constraints or more volatile cash flows hold larger cash 
balances as a buffer. Their claim is supported by Sufi’s findings (2009) that firms with lower 
cash flows are likely to rely more heavily on cash holdings in their corporate liquidity 
management. Thus large cash balances may indicate financial vulnerability rather than a 
strong liquidity position and show an opposite sign than cash flows in the regression results.  
Firms, which have stronger cash flows, obtain less trade credit. These firms can be expected 
to have less need to resort to expensive trade credit, and thus use less trade credit financing. 
But the results also show a negative relationship between cash flows and trade credit provided 
in model 7. Explaining this finding is outside of the scope of this study. The result is also no 
longer statistically significant when the sales growth control variables are added to the 
equation in model 8. Purely hypothetically, strong cash flows could be correlated with some 
omitted variable, which is associated with less trade credit provided or the causality may in 
fact work to the other direction. A quicker trade receivable turnover (i.e. lower trade credit 
provided ratio) may support firms’ cash flows. In net terms stronger cash flows are associated 
with more trade credit, i.e. cash flows have a larger negative effect to trade credit obtained 
than trade credit provided.  
Firm size seems to be positively related to trade credit obtained and provided, implying larger 
firms both obtain and provide more trade credit. The coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 1% level supporting the characterization of the variable as time-variant.   
Overall, the aggregate results on net trade credit are weak. As discussed in Chapter 5.3, this is 
not surprising. Since trade credit obtained and provided change to the same direction during 
the crisis, the changes may cancel each other out in net terms. Model 9 shows weak evidence 
of net trade credit decreasing during 2008, i.e. trade credit receivables reducing relatively 
more than trade credit payables. However, when the control variables are added to the model, 
the relationship looses statistical significance. 
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Table 6. Trade Credit in Aggregate
Exp. Exp. Exp.
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) sign (5) (6) (7) (8) sign (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.101*** 0.082*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.048***
(174.63) (227.53) (4.52) (3.46) (305.93) (277.68) (6.05) (4.23) (106.75) (99.13) (3.87) (2.70)
2007 + -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 + -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.004* +/- 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(-1.09) (-0.44) (-1.48) (-1.10) (-0.69) (-0.47) (-1.88) (-1.68) (0.72) (0.78) (0.35) (0.08)
2008 + -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.017*** +/- -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.013*** +/- -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-3.91) (-4.71) (-7.59) (-7.01) (-6.29) (-4.33) (-7.62) (-6.12) (-1.67) (-1.10) (-1.00) (-0.68)
2007*Sales growth (LSG) +/- 0.005 -0.008 +/- 0.000 -0.011 +/- -0.001 -0.004
(0.36) (-0.66) (0.02) (-0.92) (-0.08) (-0.37)
2008*Sales growth (LSG) +/- -0.002 -0.011 +/- -0.022** -0.034*** +/- -0.005 -0.017
(-0.15) (-0.75) (-2.05) (-2.69) (-0.49) (-1.60)
Cash flow (LIQ1) - -0.069*** -0.065*** + -0.036*** -0.022 + 0.029** 0.036***
(-4.08) (-3.58) (-2.85) (-1.64) (2.22) (2.58)
Cash balance (LIQ2) - 0.051*** 0.048*** + 0.023 0.026 + -0.014 -0.006
(2.80) (2.61) (1.24) (1.60) (-1.18) (-0.48)
Total assets (SIZE) + 0.026*** 0.029*** +/- 0.020*** 0.026*** +/- 0.000 0.004
(4.39) (4.25) (3.87) (4.35) (0.07) (0.81)
No. of observations 4,228 3,926 3,900 3,729 4,855 4,489 4,479 4,266 4,207 3,910 3,883 3,713
No. of groups 944 926 924 905 1,083 1,061 1,059 1,036 941 923 921 902
F-statistic 20.04*** 8.46*** 17.70*** 11.84*** 22.28*** 11.29*** 16.00*** 11.60*** 2.96* 1.53 1.84 1.62
Wooldridge test F-statistic 22.137*** 16.226*** 21.358*** 24.111*** 12.550*** 14.926*** 15.872*** 16.066*** 42.624*** 29.341*** 34.858*** 33.675***
Wald test chi2-statistic 4.4E+07***3.1E+34***4.3E+34***1.1E+37*** 1.9E+32***1.5E+35***2.6E+34***4.1E+34*** 7.6E+32***2.2E+35***3.7E+36***3.7E+36***
TCO TCP NTC
The table shows the results of fixed effects regression analysis. The dependent variables are: TCO is trade payables / cost of goods sold, TCP is trade receivables / sales and NTC is net trade
credit (i.e. trade receivables minus payables) / sales. The independent variables are: 2007 and 2008 are the two crisis year dummy variables, LSG is the logarithmic sales growth rate, LIQ1 is
cash flows / assets, LIQ2 is cash / assets measured at the beginning of the year and SIZE is the logarithm of firm's assets. The intercept is the average of firm fixed effects. The models are
estimated using an unbalanced sample of 1,084 firms and within-effects estimation with cluster robust error terms (see Chapter 5). F-statistic measures the model's goodness of fit. The test
statistics refer to Wooldridge test of serial correlation and Wald test of groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.    
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7.3. Cross-Sectional Patterns 
To understand what may be driving the aggregate patterns, the rest of the analysis is 
concentrated on firms’ heterogeneous responses to the crisis. The hypotheses 2 and 3 predict 
that firms, which are more vulnerable to the financial crisis, obtain more and provide less 
trade credit during a crisis. There are several possible proxies for the vulnerability as 
discussed in Chapter 5.3.2. This chapter presents the regression results for Equation 4 
including measures of firm size and liquidity. Firm size is a proxy for firm’s access to bank 
credit during a crisis, where as liquidity measures mainly firm’s dependence on the 
aforementioned access. 
7.3.1. Firm Size 
Firm size is the most commonly used proxy for informational frictions, which place firms in a 
disadvantaged position in bank financing during a credit crunch. Following this uneven 
position of different-sized firms vis-à-vis banks, the theory expects larger firms to 
intermediate bank credit to their smaller customers during tight money periods. Based on the 
trade credit channel theory, there is a hypothesized positive (negative) relationship between 
size and trade credit provided (obtained) during 2008. 
Table 7 reports the results of regressions on Equation 4 with ‘Crisis year*SIZE’ interaction 
variables. The decrease in trade credit during 2008 persists and the estimators stay statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all of the models 1-8 in Table 7. The results also show a positive 
relationship between size and trade credit obtained and provided. The estimated coefficients are 
small in size though, and thus the economic significance of the results is somewhat low. In the 
models including the control variable for size, the results are also statistically weak implying 
the relationship in 2008 may be partly explained by the higher trade credit use by larger firms 
in general, not only during the crisis.  
The positive size effect is so small9 in relation to the overall negative year effect that the results 
point more to a smaller decrease or no difference in larger firms’ use of trade credit during 
2008 than to an increase in its use. In 2007, size only seems to be associated with trade credit 
                                               
9 Note that size is measured as a logarithm, and thus with a coefficient of 0.002, would need to be more than 
GBP 13 billion in absolute value to cancel out the overall year effect with a coefficient of 0.019. The outlier 
treatment sets the maximum size in the data significantly lower, and thus one should be careful in concluding 
that firms of any size would actually increase their trade credit provision during the crisis.  
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obtained. In net terms, size is not associated with trade credit in any of the models 9-12. Thus 
the results do not offer any evidence to support the hypothesis of a trade credit channel. 
The puzzling question is, why is there no trade credit channel. Unfortunately answering the 
question is beyond the scope of this study and would require a more detailed analysis of large 
firms.  As  the  data  in  this  study  supports  the  aim  to  include  firms  on  a  wide  size  range,  the  
number of large firms is not high enough to conduct more detailed statistical tests on the sub-
group of large firms.  
Love et al. (2007) suggest that supply side effects cause the decrease they find in trade credit 
provided during financial crises. The results of this study in relation to firm size may be 
interpreted as supporting the supply-side explanation. As size and trade credit obtained are 
positively related during both 2007 and 2008, the findings clearly do not point to a decrease in 
trade credit demand. It seems more likely firms demand more or at least as much trade credit 
regardless of size, but large firms are (at least to some extend) less vulnerable to the reduction 
in the provision of trade credit due to e.g. better bargaining power and lower perceived 
riskiness by suppliers, i.e. the supply does not decrease or decreases less to the large firms, 
which causes the positive relationship between size and trade credit received.  
There  are  at  least  two  possible  reasons  why  the  use  of  trade  credit  is  found  to  differ  during  
financial crises than during less severe credit crunches. First, during a crisis credit rationing 
may affect a larger share of firms. Nilsen (2002) finds that even during contractionary 
monetary policy, some large firms (e.g. firms without bond rating or lacking collateralizable 
assets) use trade credit financing very similarly to small firms and suggests they may be credit 
rationed. In their recent study of financial constraints during the 2008 crisis, Campello et al. 
(2010) find a very small degree of correlation between firms’ size and propensity to declare 
themselves as either financially constrained or unconstrained. In their survey study, 51% of 
firms having annual sales of more than USD 1 billion declare themselves as somewhat or very 
affected by the crisis while the corresponding percentage is 59% for smaller firms. The 
percentages are high especially as both of their size groups can be considered to represent large 
firms. Thus their results imply that during a financial crisis, credit rationing may affect many of 
the  firms  that  are  traditionally  considered  to  maintain  access  to  bank  credit.  Campello  et  al.  
(2010) also find most other traditional measures of constraints do not correlate with firms’ 
subjective sense of financial constraints, most notable exception being a credit rating, measured 
as speculative or investment grade.  
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The second possibility (which may apply simultaneously with the first one) is that large firms 
are not necessarily credit rationed, but there is something that distinguishes a crisis from 
previously studied periods of monetary policy tightening, which makes firms unwilling to 
provide  more  trade  credit  to  their  customers.  One  reason  could  be  overall  uncertainty  of  the  
availability of bank credit in the future. If firms are uncertain whether their bank will be in 
operation next month or even next week, and the whole financial system looks to be on the 
verge of collapsing, firms are likely to become cautious about extending trade credit even if 
they have not been affected by credit rationing so far. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) show 
evidence of such cautious behavior in their study on bank lending during 2008 in the U.S. They 
find firms increased drawdowns on existing credit lines to ensure they had access to funds at 
the time of a widespread concern about the solvency of the banking sector. Cambello et al. 
(2010) find supporting evidence that firms drew funds for the fear that their banks would 
restrict access to credit in the future.  
Unfortunately, these propositions cannot be tested with the data in this study. Both would 
require more extensive sample of large firms. As the second proposition is based more on 
firms’ future expectations than current financial status, it is likely that finding any plausible 
evidence for or against it would require data outside financial statements. 
7.3.2. Liquidity 
Firms with stronger liquidity are less dependent on the availability of bank credit and are 
therefore expected to obtain less and provide more trade credit during a financial crisis. 
Liquidity is measured with the same two proxies that are used as control variables in the other 
models. Here they enter Equation 4 in interaction with the binary year variables. 
Table 8 shows the results of the regressions including cash flows per assets (LIQ1) in 
interaction with the crisis year dummies. Cash flows cannot explain trade credit provided. The 
interaction terms are not statistically significant in any of the models 4-8 for trade credit 
provision. In models 1 and 2 the results show trade credit obtained decreasing more in firms 
with stronger cash flows in 2007 relative to the previous years and in model 2, in which sales 
growth is controlled, this relationship is statistically significant also in 2008. The reduction in 
trade credit obtained reflects also to net trade credit in 2008 in model 10, implying that firms 
with stronger cash flows would increase their net trade credit, i.e. the difference between trade 
receivables and payables per assets increases with cash flows in 2008. 
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Table 8. Trade Credit and Cash Flow
Exp. Exp. Exp.
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) sign (5) (6) (7) (8) sign (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept 0.170*** 0.168*** 0.083*** 0.072*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.103*** 0.083*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.55*** 0.043***
(246.04) (226.88) (4.20) (3.19) (300.97) (271.96) (5.95) (4.19) (106.15) (98.76) (3.76) (2.69)
2007 + 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.000 + -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 +/- -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.81) (1.60) (-0.31) (0.10) (-0.07) (-0.40) (-1.33) (-1.56) (-0.25) (-0.01) (0.38) (-0.00)
2008 + -0.009*** -0.007** -0.015*** -0.014** +/- -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.013*** +/- -0.004** -0.004* -0.002 -0.002
(-2.66) (-2.08) (-4.07) (-3.72) (-4.74) (-3.63) (-5.83) (-4.59) (-1.99) (-1.75) (-0.91) (-0.82)
2007*Cash flow (LIQ1) - -0.049** -0.068*** -0.025 -0.035 + -0.014 0.007 0.016 0.025 + 0.004 0.015 -0.005 0.002
(-2.08) (-2.58) (-0.95) (-1.27) (-0.59) (0.32) (0.57) (0.95) (0.23) (0.82) (-0.23) (0.10)
2008*Cash flow (LIQ1) - -0.052 -0.064** -0.033 -0.044 + 0.000 0.010 0.018 0.011 + 0.027 0.040** 0.007 0.013
(-1.58) (-2.00) (-0.90) (-1.18) (0.01) (0.43) (0.72) (0.41) (1.42) (1.96) (0.30) (0.54)
2007*Sales growth (LSG) +/- 0.009 -0.008 +/- -0.000 -0.011 +/- -0.001 -0.003
(0.65) (-0.62) (-0.02) (-0.91) (-0.14) (-0.34)
2008*Sales growth (LSG) +/- 0.004 -0.01 +/- -0.023** -0.034*** +/- -0.011 -0.018*
(0.33) (-0.69) (-2.02) (-2.67) (-1.17) (-1.65)
Cash flow (LIQ1) - -0.057*** -0.49** + -0.043*** -0.030* + 0.028* 0.033*
(-2.88) (2.29) (-2.58) (-1.65) (1.78) (1.94)
Cash balance (LIQ2) - 0.051*** 0.048*** + 0.022 0.026 + -0.014 -0.006
(2.81) (2.66) (1.43) (1.57) (-1.19) (-0.50)
Total Assets (SIZE) + 0.027*** 0.030*** +/- 0.020*** 0.026*** +/- 0.000 0.004
(4.39) (4.32) (3.70) (4.22) (0.04) (0.74)
No. of observations 4,196 3,897 3,900 3,729 4,814 4,453 4,479 4,266 4,175 3,881 3,883 3,713
No. of groups 940 922 924 905 1,079 1,057 1,059 1,036 937 919 921 902
F-statistic 15.21*** 9.25*** 13.89*** 10.27*** 12.17*** 8.19*** 11.69*** 9.43*** 1.73 1.70 1.35 1.34
Wooldridge test F-statistic 22.576*** 15.884*** 21.406*** 23.828*** 12.164*** 14.796*** 16.371*** 16.663*** 43.464*** 29.712*** 35.597*** 34.300***
Wald test chi2-statistic 2.1E+33***1.9E+34***1.2E+35***7.2E+33*** 2.8E+33***2.5E+35***1.3E+34***5.4E+34*** 1.0E+36***1.0E+36***1.8E+36***1.1E+37***
The table shows the results the fixed effects regression analysis. The dependent variables are: TCO is trade payables / cost of goods sold, TCP is trade receivables / sales and NTC is net
trade credit (i.e. trade receivables minus payables) / sales. The independent variables are: 2007 and 2008 are the two crisis year dummy variables, LIQ1 refers to cash flows / assets, LSG is
the logarithmic sales growth, LIQ2 is cash / assets measured at the beginning of the year and SIZE is the logarithm of firm's assets. The intercept is the average of firm fixed effects. The
models are estimated using an unbalanced sample of 1,084 firms and within-effects estimation with cluster robust error terms (see Chapter 5). F-statistic measures the model's goodness of
fit. The test statistics refer to Wooldridge test of serial correlation and Wald test of groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and *
denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.    
TCO TCP NTC
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But when the level of cash flows is controlled in models 3, 4, 11 and 12, the results loose their 
statistical significance. It seems the overall negative relationship between cash flows and 
trade credit obtained explains the findings in models 1 and 2, and not their special relationship 
during a crisis. The same applies to net trade credit, to which cash flows have a general 
positive  effect.  Thus  the  results  on  cash  flows  do  not  support  the  hypothesis  of  a  particular  
relationship of liquidity and trade credit use during a crisis.  
Using cash balances to measure liquidity leads to a similar conclusion. Table 9 shows the 
regression results when cash balance (LIQ2) is included in the model in interaction with the 
crisis year variables. Larger cash balances are associated with higher levels of trade credit 
obtained during 2008 in models 1 and 2. But the result does not hold, when the control 
variable for the level of cash holdings is included in the model. 
The results show net trade credit increasing with cash balances during 2007. The result is 
stable, although its statistical significance is weak. Firms with large cash balances seem to 
increase trade credit provision more (or decrease it less) than the trade credit they obtain 
themselves in 2007, but in 2008 this no longer applies. In general cash balance has no or a 
negative relationship with trade credit, and thus the finding for 2007 is somewhat puzzling. 
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Table 9. Trade Credit and Cash Balance
Exp. (1) (4) (7) (10) Exp. (2) (5) (8) (11) Exp. (3) (6) (9) (12)
sign TCO TCO TCO TCO sign TCP TCP TCP TCP sign NTC NTC NTC NTC
Intercept 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.087*** 0.0.78*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.102*** 0.082*** 0.056*** 0.056 0.056*** 0.043***
(232.81) (222.30) (4.53) (3.50) (82.49) (272.63) (6.10) (4.27) (101.56) (96.95) (3.99) (2.79)
2007 + -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 + -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 +/- -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.49) (-0.65) (-0.86) (-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.72) (-1.61) (-1.26) (-1.10) (-0.82) (-1.20) (-1.17)
2008 + -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.020*** +/- -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.014*** +/- -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(-5.58) (-5.18) (-6.64) (-6.11) (-5.43) (-4.20) (-6.23) (-5.18) (-1.10) (-0.67) (-1.23) (-0.73)
2007*Cash Balance (LIQ2) - 0.013 0.017 -0.006 -0.001 + 0.009 0.005 0.003 -0.004 + 0.021 0.022* 0.028* 0.028*
(0.93) (1.16) (-0.39) (-0.09) (0.51) (0.32) (0.15) (-0.22) (1.47) (1.65) (1.88) (1.91)
2008*Cash Balance (LIQ2) - 0.040** 0.043** 0.022 0.027 + 0.015 0.019 0.008 0.009 + 0.003 0.001 0.01 0.004
(1.99) (2.12) (1.03) (1.21) (0.77) (0.90) (0.37) (0.39) (0.20) (0.06) (0.59) (0.24)
2007*Sales growth (LSG) +/- 0.002 -0.008 +/- -0.000 -0.011 +/- -0.000 -0.004
(0.16) (-0.65) (-0.01) (-0.89) (-0.02) (-0.45)
2008*Sales growth (LSG) +/- 0.002 -0.011 +/- -0.023 -0.034*** +/- -0.011 -0.017
(0.11) (-0.73) (-1.99) (-2.71) (-1.13) (-1.60)
Cash flow (LIQ1) - -0.070*** -0.066*** + -0.036*** -0.023* + 0.029** 0.036***
(-4.12) (-3.62) (-2.87) (-1.67) (2.22) (2.58)
Cash balance (LIQ2) - 0.047** 0.042** + 0.021 0.025 + -0.022* -0.012
(2.34) (2.05) (1.23) (1.41) (-1.66) (-0.92)
Total Assets (SIZE) + 0.026*** 0.029*** +/- 0.020*** 0.026*** +/- 0.000 0.004
(4.38) (4.23) (3.87) (4.37) (0.01) (0.76)
No. of observations 3,925 3,753 3,900 3,729 4,510 4,296 4,479 4,266 3,908 3,737 3,883 3,713
No. of groups 927 908 924 905 1,062 1,039 1,059 1,036 924 905 921 902
F-statistic 12.74*** 8.11*** 14.39*** 10.51*** 12.44*** 9.16*** 12.60*** 10.19*** 1.20 1.13 1.67 1.64
Wooldridge test F-statistic 16.156*** 14.631*** 21.373*** 24.096*** 13.004*** 15.746*** 16.269*** 16.563*** 34.116*** 32.491*** 36.024*** 34.489***
Wald test chi2-statistic 6.3E+33***8.5E+34***4.3E+34***2.1E+34*** 1.8E+35***9.1E+33***8.6E+34***1.9E+37*** 2.9E+35***1.5E+35***8.7E+34***2.6E+35***
The table shows the results of fixed effects regression analysis. The dependent variables are: TCO is trade payables / cost of goods sold, TCP is trade receivables / sales and NTC is net trade
credit (i.e. trade receivables minus payables) / sales. The independent variables are: 2007 and 2008 are the two crisis year dummy variables, LIQ2 refers to cash / assets measured at the
beginning of the year, LSG is the logarithmic sales growth, LIQ1 is cash flows / assets and SIZE is the logarithm of firm's assets. The intercept is the average of firm fixed effects. The models
are estimated using an unbalanced sample of 1,084 firms and within-effects estimation with cluster robust error terms (see Chapter 5). F-statistic measures the model's goodness of fit. The
test statistics refer to Wooldridge test of serial correlation and Wald test of groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.    
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8. Conclusions 
In this thesis I have studied the trade credit firms obtain from their suppliers and provide to 
their customers during the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 using a panel data consisting 
of 1,084 small and large firms in the U.K. The hypothesis was to find an increase in the use of 
trade credit in line with the proposition of the trade credit channel theory (Hypothesis 1). The 
theory is widely tested during periods of contractionary monetary policy, but following the 
results by Love et al. (2007), who also study trade credit use during financial crises, there was 
predetermined uncertainty whether trade credit provided would actually fall after the early 
stages of the crisis. This study also attempted to explain, what may cause the potential change 
in the use of trade credit, the hypothesis being that firms, which are more vulnerable to the 
financial crisis obtain more and provide less trade credit than less vulnerable firms 
(Hypothesis 1 and 2).  
Table 10. Hypotheses and Results
Independent variable Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result
Year 2007 + n/a + ( - )
Year 2008 + - +/- -
Firm size - + + ( + )
Liquidity - n/a + n/a
Dependent variable
The table summarizes the hypothesized and found relationships between dependent and independent variables. Brackets
around the sign signify certain uncertainty in the result due to unrobustness in the statistical significance, n/a refer to no
result.
Trade credit obtained Trade credit provided
 
This study has attempted to answer two questions. First, does the use of trade credit change 
when bank lending is limited? The results show robust evidence for an affirmative answer. As 
Table 10 summarizes, this study finds a decrease in both trade credit provided and supplied 
during 2008. The results are statistically significant in all of the regression models as well as 
in the ANOVA analysis of the difference in the aggregate means. The finding is in strong 
violation with Hypothesis 1, but in regard to the decreasing provision of trade credit after the 
early stages of a crisis,  the result  is  similar to what Love et  al.  (1997) find when they study 
trade credit use during financial crises in the 1990’s. This study thus offers further evidence 
that the use of trade credit behaves differently during financial crises than contractinary 
monetary policy. Although there is some evidence of trade credit use decreasing already in 
2007, the results mainly do not support the characterization of the 2007 as a crisis year for the 
purpose of this study.  
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The second question was, does firms’ vulnerability to the crisis affect the change in the use of 
trade credit? In terms of explaining why trade credit use decreases in 2008, this study is able 
to provide only little insights. The regression results show some evidence of larger firms 
providing more trade credit during 2008, but size is also positively associated with trade 
credit obtained. This seems to suggest it is more likely the aggregate results are driven by the 
supply of rather than demand for trade credit, but explaining the results would require a more 
detailed analysis of large firms, which is outside of the scope of this study. 
Liquidity is unable to explain the reduction in the use of trade credit during 2008. Stronger 
liquidity  is  in  general  associated  with  less  use  of  obtained  trade  credit,  but  there  is  no  
evidence of a special relationship during a crisis. Results on liquidity and trade credit 
provision are overall somewhat mixed and unrobust, and there is no sign of liquidity affecting 
firms’ provision of trade credit during the crisis.  
This study shows robust evidence that there was no trade credit channel during the crisis in 
the U.K. Further studies are needed to explain the aggregate decrease in the use of trade 
credit. From a theoretical and logical standpoint it is hard to argue, why the decrease would 
be demand-driven, and studies could focus on what causes the supply to dry up in a crisis 
unlike during monetary policy contractions. An interesting aspect for future studies would 
also be to extend the time period further to analyze how long does it take for trade credit to 
recover from the crisis.   
The  ability  to  explain  the  use  of  trade  credit  with  financial  statement  data  is  limited.  Trade  
credit receivables or payables do not reveal direct information about supply of or demand for 
trade credit. During a financial crisis, when actions are driven to a greater extent by future 
uncertainty, the problem of relying on firms’ current financial standing is emphasized. Further 
studies should broaden the research to studies on proprietary data, which at its best would link 
buyers and sellers directly. 
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Appendices 
List of Variables
Abbreviation Name Description
Dependent variables (TC)
TCO Trade credit obtained Trade credit payables scaled by cost of goods sold. 
TCP Trade credit provided Trade credit receivables scaled by sales. 
NTC Net trade credit The difference between trade credit receivables and payables scaled
by sales. A positive (negative) figure imply the firm provides more
(less) trade credit than it obtaines itself relative to sales. 
Independent variables
Crisis year dummies (CY)
2007 First crisis year A dummy variable for the year 2007, i.e. the first crisis year in the
research period. The variable gets a value 1 if the observation is from
year 2007 and 0 otherwise.
2008 Second crisis year A dummy variable for the year 2007, i.e. the second crisis year in the
research period. The variable gets a value 1 if the observation is from
year 2008 and 0 otherwise.
Measures of the vulnerability to the financial crisis (VFC) 
SIZE Firm size Logarith of firm's total assets.
LIQ1 Cash flows Cash flows scaled by assets. Cash flows are included as a proxy for
liquidity. Cash flows are estimated as the sum of net income and
depreciation. 
LIQ2 Cash balances Cash and cash equivalents scaled by assets at the beginning of the
year. Cash balances are included as a proxy for liquidity. 
Control variables (LSG)
LSG Sales growth The logarithm of annual sales growth rate. The variable is included as
a proxy for business volume growth trend change during a year and is
targeted to control the market level decrease in volume during the
latter half of 2008.
Control variables (X)
LIQ1 Cash flows See description above.
LIQ2 Cash balances See description above.
SIZE Firm size See description above.  
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